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Abstract 
 
 This thesis examines civil defense in the United States under the Nixon, Carter and 
Reagan administrations. Throughout the late Cold War period civil defense policy planners 
employed a philosophy of dual-use. The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA) and the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) instructed the American public to plan for 
a nuclear attack as well as natural disasters. Civil defense directors implemented crisis 
relocation plans for Americans that lived in designated high-risk areas. In an imminent 
nuclear attack, Americans in high-risk areas would temporarily relocate to host 
communities in low-risk areas of the county. This study is a blend of both civil defense 
policy and the reactions to nuclear war through the prism of popular culture in the late 
Cold War period. 
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Introduction and Historiography 
The concept of defending American citizens from an atomic attack has been around 
since the successful detonation of an atomic bomb by the Soviet Union in 1949. Nuclear 
paranoia and the quest to build bigger and more powerful super weapons led to different 
attempts by Americans to shore up perceived vulnerabilities to an enemy attack. Under the 
Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations duck and cover and sheltering was the 
mantra of civil defense proponents. In the 1970s and 1980s American civil defense officials 
advocated crisis relocation plans and employed a philosophy of dual-use. They instructed 
individuals to be in a constant state of preparedness for both natural and man-made 
disasters and to plan for the unthinkable.  
Government officials and civil defense proponents, with some exceptions, generally 
regarded the usefulness of civil defense as a deterrent vis-à-vis the Soviet Union while 
professionals in the medical and scientific communities remained skeptical of the 
implications in a post-attack United States. Physicians and physicists stressed the immense 
power of nuclear weapons and their ability to destroy humanity and entire ecosystems; to 
them, civil defense promoted a false sense of security. Reports of massive Soviet civil 
defense efforts in the late 1970s by the American Right led to accusations of a survivability 
gap and brought greater national awareness to the urgency of civil defense on American 
soil. The ‘civil defense gap’ also added new energy and resources to a neglected civilian 
defense culture.  
Elementary school children would not escape the efforts of civil defense enthusiasts. 
Duck and cover, the popular notion for kids to hide under their desk in the event of a 
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nuclear war, became a thing of the past as pilot programs were introduced and brought up 
to date with the concept of crisis relocation planning. Efforts were ramped up from the 
private sector to the upper echelons of the American government as some American 
corporations capitalized on public nuclear fears and offered services that were beyond the 
financial means of the average American family. Continuity of government plans were an 
example of elite level civil defense, as a plethora of options were developed for the 
President and members of Congress to survive and reciprocate nuclear strikes.  
The near catastrophe at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania 
in 1979 created nuclear paranoia as media reports conflicted with those from plant 
operators and investigators. Residents were in a panicky state for two weeks as they 
awaited the possibility of a mass evacuation. Civil defense officials remained confident 
throughout the crisis that a mass evacuation was feasible which contrasted from the 
Governor who argued the opposite. The incident at Three Mile Island provides a case study 
to gage the effectiveness of the emergency response and the reactions by local residents to 
the disaster.  
Cultural reactions to nuclear war and civil defense in the late Cold War period was 
manifested through a multitude of forms including, films, fiction, children’s books and 
music. Taken as a whole, it suggests a pervasiveness of nuclear issues in popular culture as 
well as a deep disconnect between government policy and American popular culture. 
Tensions between the U.S. and Soviets were also reflected among the phenomenon of 
privatized civil defense. Non-government affiliated survivalists urged Americans to take 
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survival preparations seriously and firmly believed that civil defense planning would allow 
many Americans to survive nuclear Armageddon.   
By the late 1970s the Cold War was ratcheting up and a new phase of confrontation 
between the United States and Soviet Union began. Public opinion polls throughout the late 
Cold War period indicated nuclear anxiety as Americans felt Armageddon was likely to 
occur. Although largely dormant by the late 1960s, the impetus to renew civil defense 
efforts came as a result of an alleged Soviet ‘civil defense gap’ in 1978 by right wing 
American politicians. Late Cold War civil defense officials touted crisis relocation plans as 
being the most effective mechanism for surviving nuclear Armageddon, but make-shift 
expedient shelters were still recommended for those who did not live in designated high-
risk areas. Crisis relocation plans had an incentive of a minimum requirement of energy 
and expenditures for the American populace. Civil defense officials reassured residents that 
ample warning time and everyday practice enabled emergency population mobilization. 
Proponents and even government officials argued that the absence of a civilian defense 
program only increased the chances of American capitulation to Soviet demands. 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the confidence exuded by the various civil defense 
agencies never completely trickled down to the American people. For those concentrated in 
large, densely populated urban centers, the apparent infeasibility of crisis relocation plans 
in the face of a nuclear attack created a sense of apathy. 
While American historians have devoted most of their attention to the civil defense 
establishment in the 1950s and 1960s, few scholars have uncovered the aspect of civil 
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defense under the Carter and Reagan Administrations.1 Documenting civil defense 
throughout the late Cold War period is especially salient given that the existing literature is 
largely concentrated on the various civil defense agencies throughout the Truman, 
Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations. Historians Thomas Kerr and Dee Garrison 
document the ‘civil defense gap’ in the 1970s and Garrison examines crisis relocation plans 
in the 1980s, but they do not delve into late Cold War popular culture. Tracy Davis’ 
monograph is a comparison between American, British and Canadian civil defense efforts 
during the 1950s and 1960s, but she does briefly highlight American civil defense efforts in 
the 1980s. This study is a blend of both civil defense policy and the reactions to nuclear war 
through the prism of popular culture in the late Cold War period. 
Historians such as Margot Henriksen, Paul Boyer, Allan Winkler and Laura 
McEnaney all seem to agree that by the mid to late 1960s, the concept of civil defense had 
become somewhat of a cultural relic, never attracting the kind of attention it had received 
in the previous years. They also agree that, as Henriksen put it, “interest revived briefly 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, but subsided as the crisis passed.”2 
However, there are some significant disagreements in the historiography, as a number of 
explanations have been provided to explain the waning of interest in the civil defense 
                                                          
1
 For discussion of civil defense in the 1950s and 1960s, see: Paul Boyer, By the Bombs Early Light: American 
Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994); Allan 
Winkler, Life Under a Cloud: American Anxiety about the Atom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Laura 
McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2000); Margot Henriksen, Dr. Strangelove’s America: Society and Culture in the Atomic Age 
(California: University of California Press, 1997); and Guy Oakes, The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American 
Cold War Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).  For discussion of civil defense in the 1970s and 1980s, 
see Tracy Davis, Stages of Emergency: Cold War Nuclear Civil Defense (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2007); 
Dee Garrison, Bracing for Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006); and Thomas Kerr, Civil Defense in the U.S.: Bandaid for a Holocaust? (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1983). 
2
 Henriksen, Dr. Strangelove’s America, 233-235. 
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establishment in the mid to late 1960s.  Boyer and Winkler examine the “cultural attention 
to the nuclear threat”3 in the 1980s which shows that historians were cognizant of the 
atmosphere but, researching and writing at the time that history was unfolding, they 
neglect the resurgence of civil defense in the late Cold War period.  
Henriksen highlights the “moral awakening” of American citizens as a result of the 
“Gun Thy Neighbour” debate in 1961 and felt that this moral stance against selfish 
homeowners created a public backlash as the “open defense or display of shelters suffered 
a quiet demise…Americans no longer felt comfortable displaying their preparedness.”4 She 
also believes that citizens began to reject the complete reversal of human behaviour 
needed to survive in a sheltered America as “a truly sheltered America would entail 
astronomical costs and outrageous changes in lifestyle…only a mole-like life would be 
effective.”5 McEnaney agrees with Henriksen’s interpretation of a rejection of a “mole-like” 
lifestyle as “sustaining popular interest and getting people to move from bomb 
consciousness to a change in behaviour ultimately proved impossible.”6 She posits that the 
“gospel of self-help” led many Americans to “repudiate a level of militarization that 
required them to finance their own security…they rejected the idea of living with a physical 
reminder of nuclear war inside or outside of their homes.”7  
Winkler looks to the drastically improved technological weapons and the futility of 
effective defense against it as “arguments of opponents who felt protection was impossible 
became increasingly persuasive…human purpose took precedence over a haphazard effort 
                                                          
3
 Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light, xi. 
4
 Henriksen, Dr. Strangelove’s America, 217-218. 
5
 Ibid, 215. 
6
 McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home, 62. 
7
 Ibid, 66. 
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to hide citizens from the effects of nuclear war.”8 Winkler also adds a new dimension to the 
debate; he points to the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963 which banned nuclear testing in 
the atmosphere, on the ground and underwater and was convinced that the treaty resolved 
the issue of radiation and contributed to the public’s lack of concern.9  With an end to 
“atmospheric testing and eliminating the fallout”, the Limited Test Ban Treaty “neutralized 
proponents of protection and left civil defense as a casualty of the arms-control process.”10  
Boyer agrees with Winkler that after the Limited Test Ban Treaty, “almost overnight, 
the nuclear fear that had been building since the 1950s seemed to dissipate.”11 He believes 
that the treaty put the nuclear arms race out of sight and mind as “it did not stop the 
nuclear arms race but it gave the appearance that something was being done about the 
hazards of nuclear war.”12 He also adds a new explanation as to why interest in civil 
defense declined in the mid to late-1960s and points to the expanding war by American 
forces in Vietnam: “the war absorbed nearly every available drop of antiwar energy heavily 
contributing to nuclear apathy.”13 Thus as can be seen in the early Cold War civil defense 
historiography, some historians attributed the demise of civil defense due to events such as 
the Vietnam War and the Limited Test Ban Treaty while others explained waning interest 
as a result of a rejection of a groundhog lifestyle.  
What provided the impetus for the renewed focus of civil defense in the late Cold 
War period? Historian Thomas Kerr argued that by the mid to late 1970s, “interest in the 
                                                          
8
 Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 130-131. 
9
 Ibid, 132. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Boyer, By the Bombs Early Light, 355. 
12
 Ibid, 356. 
13
 Ibid, 358. 
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concept of civil defense began to revive due to rising concern in some quarters over a 
buildup of Soviet civil defense capabilities.”14 The renewed energy for civil defense was 
largely a result of the American Right and the 1977 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) study 
that highlighted an alleged ‘civil defense gap’.15 A look at the annual Congressional 
appropriations to the civil defense agencies in the 1970s and 1980s lends credence to 
Kerr’s argument. In 1970 the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) submitted an appropriation 
request for $73.8 million which “was the lowest civil defense request ever submitted to 
Congress.”16 Clearly members of the legislative branch did not hold the civil defense agency 
in high regards in the early 1970s. Years of dormancy within the OCD led to austere 
budgetary estimates by civil defense officials. By the time of the CIA study the 1977 request 
“was for $76 million but Congress appropriated $87 million which was the first time that 
Congress appropriated more than what was requested.”17 This trend of increased annual 
Congressional appropriations continued into the early 1980s as “action on the fiscal year 
1983 request resulted in the appropriation of $147.8 million.”18 By the late 1970s a 
renewed energy infused the civil defense agency and members of Congress responded in 
kind and provided the mechanism to bolster American defensive efforts. 
What were some of the factors of continuity and change with regards to civil defense 
philosophies and protocols from the early Cold War period to the late Cold War period? 
What was new in this period and what was simply a return of the old civil defense 
establishment? One factor of continuity that revived in the 1970s and 1980s consisted of 
                                                          
14
 Kerr, Civil Defense in the U.S., 149. 
15
 Ibid, 149-152. 
16
 B. Wayne Blanchard, American Civil Defense, 1954-1984: The Evolution of Programs and Policies (Emmetsburg, 
Maryland: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1985), 16. 
17
 Ibid, 20. 
18
 Ibid, 23. 
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the notion of “self-help”. As Laura McEnaney has noted, in the 1950s “self-help shifted the 
financial burden for readiness from the state to the individual, mandating that consumer-
citizens purchase the tools of survival.”19 This meant that individual citizens had the 
primary responsibility to safeguard themselves and their families against a possible atomic 
attack. Since planners knew that it was “foolish to promise that all would survive, they said 
civil defense could minimize risk for many; if citizens believed the government would 
protect them, they would think civil defense was unnecessary and therefore not practice 
it.”20 The rationale behind this was to place the impetus on American citizens to protect 
themselves in order to combat apathy which would be the inevitable result of assured 
government protection. In the Carter and Reagan years, this notion of “self-help” reared 
again with the implementation of crisis relocation plans. Eight out of every ten Americans 
who lived in designated high-risk areas were expected to temporarily relocate to host areas 
using their own private automobiles.21 Thus for the vast majority of American citizens, 
most of the expense as well as the hassle of departing in gridlocked traffic was put on the 
evacuees. 
One factor of change in terms of civil defense protocols in the late Cold War period 
was the implementation of crisis relocation plans. In the 1950s and 1960s civil defense 
officials endorsed plans that emphasized private and community shelters as the primary 
instrument of defense against an atomic attack. To illustrate this, the Federal Civil Defense 
Administration joined forces with Archer Productions, a New York advertising company, in 
1951 and created a film called Our Cities Must Fight. Presented as a dialogue between two 
                                                          
19
 McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home, 7. 
20
 Ibid, 24. 
21
 Davis, Stages of Emergency, 322. 
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newspaper editors, it “reflected the early attitude that cities should not be evacuated in the 
face of an atomic bombing.”22 The logic behind the film was that American citizens would 
be needed in their own communities to help rebuild infrastructure and produce goods and 
services.  
Henriksen posits that as a result of “Soviet Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles that 
could reach America from Siberia in thirty minutes…the vastly reduced warning time 
effectively ended the possibility of mass evacuation as a viable form of civil defense.”23 
With not enough warning time to evacuate, citizens in the 1950s and 1960s were 
instructed to duck and cover and seek refuge in a private home shelter, if they had one, or 
their nearest community shelter. During the 1970s and 1980s, the “political situation 
suggested that surprise attack was unlikely, and instead a period of tension would precede 
any nuclear war.”24 Civil defense planners expected a minimum of three days of advanced 
warning time so the policies and protocols under the Carter and Reagan Administrations 
adjusted. Civil defense directors in the late Cold War period advocated crisis relocation 
plans and reassured Americans that there would be ample time to evacuate cities during a 
period of increased international tensions. 
 
 
 
                                                          
22
 Our Cities Must Fight (1951), The Atomic Platters: Cold War Music and Educational Films from the Golden Age of 
Homeland Security (Germany: Bear Family Records, 2005). 
23
 Henriksen, Dr. Strangelove’s America, 105. 
24
 Davis, Stages of Emergency, 172. 
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Chapter I – Civil Defense under the Nixon and Carter Administrations 
Civil Defense in the Nixonian Era 
 The first chapter traces the introduction of crisis relocation plans and the scientific 
and public response. It looks at some of the proposed schemes by civil defense officials to 
implement population relocation as well as methods of operation. Concerns over an alleged 
‘civil defense gap’ by right wing American politicians will be examined in the context of 
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and the emerging influence of neoconservatives in 
government. The near meltdown at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant provided a 
test case to assess the ability of emergency management agencies to handle a crisis as well 
as gage public attitudes and reactions to the incident. 
In 1972 President Nixon abolished the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) and, in its place, 
created the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA).25 The DCPA incorporated the 
functions of planning for natural and man-made disasters into a philosophy of dual-use 
which included emergency contingency planning for nuclear war as well as hurricanes, 
tornadoes and earthquakes.26 However, planning for peacetime natural disasters would 
take a backseat to preparing for a nuclear attack until the establishment of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 1979. Although annual House appropriations 
to the DCPA in the 1970s were a fraction of what was requested, civil defense officials at 
the state and local levels fervently conditioned Americans to plan for the unthinkable and 
be in a constant state of preparedness in the event of a nuclear attack or other natural 
emergency.  
                                                          
25
 Garrison, Bracing for Armageddon, 140. 
26
 Ibid. 
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An annual report by the DCPA in 1973 provides a glimpse into the efforts and 
activities of state and local civil defense directors in the early 1970s. In a glowing report 
from John Davis, national director of the DCPA, he stated that additional progress had been 
made “toward the objective of providing the entire population of the United States with 
shelter from the hazards which could result from a nuclear attack.”27 The main role of the 
agency in early 1970s was twofold: locate potential shelter spaces for the entire population 
as well as assist locales that were considered high-risk areas in the development of crisis 
relocation plans.  
In the realm of community shelters Davis commented that “survey operations 
continued to be principally of an updating nature confined, for the most part, to areas 
developing community shelter plans…the nationwide shelter inventory was increased by 
7,197 facilities resulting in a grand total of 224,368 facilities.”28 In addition the DCPA made 
funds available for state directors to acquire the services of Community Shelter Planning 
Officers whose role it was to give “technical assistance to city and county governments in 
the development of their community shelter plans and to develop plans for dealing with 
peacetime disasters as well as the effects of a nuclear attack.”29 A DCPA sponsored research 
task force in 1973 also introduced “procedures for conducting contingency planning for 
population relocation during periods of increased threat for communities considered at 
high-risk to direct weapons effects.”30 As a result of the research efforts on behalf of the 
                                                          
27
 John Davis, Foresight: Defense Civil Preparedness Agency Annual Report #2, FY 1973 (Virginia: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1974), 15. 
28
 Ibid, 16. 
29
 Ibid, 18. 
30
 Ibid. 
12 
 
DCPA, crisis relocation plans were developed as part of a pilot project in a few urban cities 
with populations that exceeded 50, 000 during 1974.  
B. Wayne Blanchard, who became a planning specialist for civil defense programs in 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, has shed light on the nature of crisis 
relocation plans in the United States during the 1970s. He concluded that crisis relocation 
plans were developed after several dozen research projects on “issues including movement 
feasibility, food redistribution, medical care and electrical power and was deployed only 
after thorough discussion with the state director’s association…who agreed that planning 
should be commenced.”31 Blanchard claimed that state planners, who were funded by the 
DCPA, were responsible for creating and introducing these emergency evacuation plans to 
city and county officials and that “efforts were underway in nearly all states by 1976-
1977.”32 However it should be noted that “federal assistance in 1977 was solely for attack 
preparedness as Congress appropriated $87 million to the DCPA.”33 This completely 
reversed the dual-use philosophy of the DCPA which “had been that improved capabilities 
to deal with peacetime disasters were a secondary but desirable objective of the civil 
defense program.”34 For those state and regional civil defense directors who saw the 
futility of emergency evacuation plans in the event of a nuclear attack, the attack 
preparedness qualifier created a strong desire for a consolidated agency that treated the 
importance of preparing for natural and man-made disasters equally. 
 
                                                          
31
 Blanchard, American Civil Defense 1945-1984, 20. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Ibid, 21. 
34
 Ibid. 
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The Scientific Community and the Public Response 
Initial reactions to the concept of crisis relocation planning were met with mixed 
reviews, especially among members of the scientific community. An article that ran in the 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in March 1974 conceded that whatever nation launched a 
nuclear attack first would be in a slightly better position. Columns that ran in the Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists espoused progressive views that tended towards the left-center of the 
political spectrum. Herbert York stated that in the event of a full-scale nuclear war between 
the U.S. and Soviet Union, “most of the urban populations could be killed and most of the 
industry and commerce could be destroyed by the direct and immediate effects of the 
nuclear explosions.”35 York estimated that a large scale nuclear war “would result in the 
order of ten million casualties from cancer and leukemia in countries situated well away 
from the two protagonists.”36 The scientific community clearly sensed that a nuclear 
exchange between the two countries would have grave implications for the entire world.  
Conversely, the National Review featured an article in 1976 that endorsed crisis 
relocation planning as a deterrent to a Soviet pre-emptive strike as long as serious plans 
were in place. Columns in the National Review tended towards the far right of the political 
spectrum. Historian David Farber asserts that the journal “was an institutional beachhead 
on which conservative political activists could sort out their worldviews and organize their 
campaigns to take on what they perceived as an establishmentarian liberal consensus.”37 
Conservative activists treated American nuclear arsenals as providing a strong posture vis-
                                                          
35
 Herbert F. York, “Deterrence by Means of Mass Destruction,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (March 1974), 6. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 David Farber, The Rise and Fall of Modern American Conservatism: A Short History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2010), 41. 
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à-vis the Soviet Union. “The DCPA is laying plans for what is called crisis relocation 
planning”, wrote Carsten Haaland and Eugene Wigner. “Such evacuation plans, if they 
appear credible to the Soviet leaders, will go far toward preventing a serious confrontation 
from occurring well into the 1980s, if at all.”38 The logic behind their assertion came from 
the belief that if the Soviet Union knew that the U.S. had an effective mechanism for 
emergency population mobilization, they would think twice before launching a nuclear 
strike that would be reciprocated.  
Paul Hodge, a reporter with the Washington Post, uncovered the crisis relocation 
plans that were being studied by the DCPA for Washington and Virginia area residents. In 
an article that made front page news in January 1977, Hodge reported that “plans to 
evacuate two million Washington-area residents to rural and West Virginia during threat of 
nuclear war are being studied by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency.”39 Out of the pilot 
evacuation studies conducted in small cities, Hodge asserted: “all are finding that mass 
evacuation is feasible in most parts of the country except in California and the Northeast, 
where well over 50 million people would have to be evacuated and shelter, food and 
supplies found for them in rural areas.”40 John Bex, a state director for civil defense efforts 
among the mid-Atlantic states, was one of many who was convinced of the usefulness of 
crisis relocation plans: “It’s absolutely feasible to evacuate Washington, given a day or 
two’s notice…Hell, we do it on a limited scale with 360, 000 people every day during rush 
                                                          
38
 Carsten M. Haaland and Eugene P. Wigner, “Surviving a Nuclear War,” National Review (Vol. 28, No. 35, 
September 1976), 1005.   
39
 Paul Hodge. “Civil Defense Studies Plan for Evacuation of Northern Virginia,” The Washington Post (January 20, 
1977), VA1.  
40
 Ibid. 
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hour.”41 The DCPA acknowledged that crisis relocation plans for locales such as New York 
City might never work due to a large amount of people concentrated in a small area with 
limited access routes. Therefore, the impetus was to concentrate on smaller, high-risk 
communities first and develop plans for larger areas once it was proved it could work.  
So what exactly was considered a feasible crisis relocation plan? A good example can 
be found in the late 1970s in Oklahoma City. According to the New York Times, by the end of 
1978 only eight cities in the entire nation had an emergency evacuation plan: Oklahoma 
City, OK; Utica-Rome, N.Y; Dover, DE; Macon, GA; Duluth, MN; Tucson, AZ; Great Falls, MT 
and Colorado Springs, CO.42 The DCPA considered Oklahoma City a high-risk area due to its 
proximity to several military bases. Other criteria for inclusion in a high-risk area included 
population centers with more than 50, 000 people and a city’s proximity to strategic 
missile silo bases.43  
As the New York Times reported, during a period of imminent threat directions on 
where to go would appear in the three Oklahoma City newspapers as well as on the radio 
and television. In the first nine hours after the President’s order of evacuation, residents 
would be allowed “unrestricted movement to travel outside the risk area which would 
enable families to move in with relatives and friends outside the city.”44 After the first nine 
hours had elapsed, families with car license plates that ended in an even number would 
depart to one of fourteen host counties in Oklahoma where they would be assigned to 
                                                          
41
 Ibid, VA3.  
42
 Bernard Weinraub, “Oklahoma Shows That It’s Always Been Serious About Civil Defense,” The New York Times 
(December 1, 1978), A20. 
43
 Kerr, Civil Defense in the U.S., 157-158. 
44
 Weinraub, “Oklahoma Shows That It’s Always Been Serious About Civil Defense,” A20. 
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schools and other buildings for at least two weeks.45 After eighteen hours had elapsed, 
families with car license plates that ended with an odd number would vacate.46 Although 
this is just one example of a feasible crisis relocation plan, by the end of the 1970s, with 
some exceptions, states and counties across America engaged with an increased level of 
enthusiasm for civil defense that would continue to the early 1980s.  
One of the bizarre methods of crisis relocation was reported in the Chicago Tribune 
in 1978 and was put forth by an Illinois civil defense official. He believed that all one 
needed to have in order to survive a nuclear attack was two feet and a heartbeat. A 
comparison was made between the annual Marine Corps marathon in Chicago and the 
ability to disguise mass evacuation as a jogging marathon. As Dick West reported, “about 
7,000 people ran 26 miles in the annual Marine Corps marathon…had they run the same 
distance out of the city, they would have been well away from ground zero.”47 Defending 
his rationale, the Illinois civil defense director believed that mass evacuation by vehicle 
would only serve to provoke an enemy, “but if we dress them in jogging togs and sent them 
loping off into the countryside, the enemy would assume it was merely another mass 
marathon and would not take alarm.”48  
Another bizarre concept was advocated by a Los Angeles County civil defense 
official and contained a Social Darwinian aspect to it. Robert Kingsbury proposed a “Noah’s 
Ark plan whereby only the young and healthy hit the highways and the old and sick would 
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stay behind.”49 The logic behind Kingsbury’s crisis relocation plan was that high priority 
evacuees would be needed in the post-attack aftermath while the elderly and sick would 
“serve only to place a burden on the survivors.”50 For those who would not have the 
physical capacity or endurance to make it, their best bet was to hope and pray that a 
nuclear attack would never occur. 
In order to inform and educate the American population on how to protect 
themselves in the nuclear era, the DCPA released a short instructional video in 1978. 
Protection in the Nuclear Age instructs viewers that “an attack could come by surprise but 
most likely during a period of increased international tensions…if there is sufficient time to 
evacuate cities many millions of lives will be saved.”51 Citizens were reassured that after 
the initial blast there would be a thirty minute lapse before radioactive fallout commenced: 
“It’s not contagious, you do have defenses against radiation…mass, distance and time. 
Thick, heavy, dense materials like brick or packed earth to shield you and after two weeks 
only one tenth of one percent of the radiation is left.”52 In terms of the kind of protection 
available to the public, the DCPA advised those in high-risk areas to relocate temporarily to 
host areas in the countryside which they conceded was a “difficult problem requiring much 
planning but not to worry, we relocate millions of workers from our big cities every 
evening rush hour.”53 For the rest of the U.S. they advised those with home shelters to put 
them to use and for those who did not, there were more than enough public shelters to 
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shield the entire population, as long as residents brought lots of food and water with 
them.54  
A look at public opinion polls in the late 1970s provides a glimpse into American 
citizen’s views regarding civil defense efforts and their receptivity towards the DCPA 
programs. A poll conducted in 1977 highlighted a gap in American knowledge of DCPA 
plans while also revealing that a number of those surveyed voted for increased civil 
defense efforts. While “74 percent did not know where the nearest public shelter was 
located, 37 percent were in favour of requiring every new U.S. house built to come with a 
bomb shelter, with the federal government paying for most of the costs.”55  
The poll was conducted again in 1979 and showed both an increased awareness of 
civil defense plans and a heightened sense that the United States simply needed to ramp up 
its efforts. In the late 1970s the press reported that the Soviet Union had an extensive civil 
defense program. Although there was considerable debate that cast doubts on Soviet civil 
defense efforts, public opinion was skewed towards acceptance out of fear that the U.S. had 
fallen behind the Soviets in the realm of nuclear defense planning. The Gallup Poll revealed 
that while “52 percent of persons interviewed said we should do more than we are 
currently doing; only 24 percent said they knew where the nearest public shelter, if any, is 
located.”56  
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The Committee on the Present Danger and the ‘Civil Defense Gap’  
In 1976 newly appointed CIA Director George H. W. Bush gathered a conservative 
“team of outside experts to review classified data and to draw up its own separate report 
on the Soviets and its intentions.”57 Team B consisted of ten neoconservative members and 
included Richard Pipes, professor of Russian history at Harvard University, and Paul 
Wolfowitz, who worked at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.58 The Team B 
report “presented an analysis of Soviet motivations profoundly different from the one U.S. 
intelligence had been offering” and “concluded that the Soviets were striving for military 
superiority…and that it viewed détente as means of achieving this goal.”59 Such allegations 
were warmly received by the American Right and policymakers formed a lobbying 
organization called the Committee on the Present Danger “to produce an intellectual 
counterweight to détente.”60 Like Team B, the Committee on the Present Danger was 
stacked with neoconservative intellectuals eager to increase the defense budget and 
pushed for a more aggressive policy towards the Soviets. 
According to historian Dee Garrison, from the mid-1970s until the late 1980s the 
Committee on the Present Danger “warned of a civil defense gap that put the survival of 
American society at risk.”61 The Committee on the Present Danger highlighted the alleged 
Soviet commitment to shelters and evacuation and claimed that Soviet preparations for 
“civil defense was clearly as dangerous as its growing military strength, for its elaborate 
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system would allow it to win and survive a nuclear conflict.”62 In the view of committee 
members, preparing for nuclear war required infusing public confidence in the American 
civil defense establishment.63 Garrison notes that the American Right “depended on 
frightening the American public into believing that the Soviet civil defense program would 
protect 90 percent of Soviet citizens from death in a nuclear exchange, while Americans 
would be unprotected.”64 Right wing politicians were against reductions in U.S. nuclear 
arsenals and clamoured for an increase in defense spending to shore up the ‘civil defense 
gap’.  
A two part feature in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in March and April 1978 
called into question the efficacy of Soviet civil defense preparations and labelled them 
mostly as mere paper plans. Fred Kaplan, in part one, invoked the scenario that Committee 
on the Present Danger members were warning of with a ‘civil defense gap’: “The Soviets, 
after evacuating their cities, force American leaders to give in to certain demands 
threatening a nuclear strike otherwise.”65 In order for that scenario to work, American 
officials had to believe in the credibility and effectiveness of the Soviet civil defense 
program that they viewed a pre-emptive strike as unnecessary.  
The dominant view within the scientific community, expressed by Fred Kaplan, was 
that the “Soviet civil defense program would be inadequate in the face of a large-scale 
nuclear attack and that the U.S. currently has more than sufficient capability to nullify 
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whatever passive-defense measures that may have been taken by the Soviets.”66 Kaplan 
systematically attacked the ability to evacuate large industrial cities such as Moscow and 
Leningrad due to a small percentage of private automobiles and an abysmal transportation 
infrastructure.67 Regarding the construction of expedient shelters in the countryside, he 
argued that the “ground is frozen in the Soviet Union all winter. In the spring and summer, 
food stocks are virtually depleted as the planting season is about to begin. Autumn is the 
time when it rains nearly all the time and when everything is muddy.”68 If the Soviet people 
desired to build expedient shelters there would be a very limited window of opportunity. 
However, Soviet civil defense was seen as just another tactic to manipulate the population 
as it “helps maintain order at home, being an excellent means both for reinforcing a 
garrison-state mentality and for instilling a faith that the Communist Party watches over 
and protects its people.”69 To Kaplan, Soviet civil defense symbolized another means of 
control and remained a plan not executed from paper.  
Historian Thomas Kerr has framed American civil defense efforts in the 1970s as 
providing a credible posture of deterrence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. According to a 1977 
study conducted by the CIA, the Soviets had spent eight to ten times more than Americans 
on civil defense in fiscal year 1977 and “if duplicated in the United States, would have cost 
about $2 billion.”70 Kerr maintained that if evidence “demonstrated that steps were being 
taken to protect Soviet citizens, while Americans remained essentially unprotected, then 
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the credibility of the U.S. deterrent would be seriously eroded.”71 In other words if the 
Soviets believed that American populations were vulnerable to attack they would not think 
twice about a pre-emptive strike.  
The CIA figure of $2 billion was met with criticism from members of the scientific 
community who felt that the unclassified report neglected key differences within the study. 
Lee Aspin, an economist, claimed that the estimate was “derived not from an exchange rate 
calculation but from a duplicate basis…70 percent of this dollar estimate consists of 
manpower costs, assuming that Soviet civil defense workers are paid. Higher manpower 
costs in the U.S. significantly inflate the budget estimate.”72 This figure would be repeatedly 
referred to in the early 1980s under the Reagan Administration as the estimate for national 
civil defense expenditures needed to combat the ‘civil defense gap’ that supposedly existed 
between the Soviet Union and the United States.  
Leon Goure, a Soviet emigrant to the United States, was one of the most vocal 
attesters to a strong Soviet civil defense program. Goure based his views from personal 
experience and with interviews he conducted with Soviet immigrants and claimed that the 
adult population completed annual compulsory civil defense courses while children were 
taught lessons in the second, fifth and ninth grades.73 Although he conceded that the harsh 
Soviet winters posed “special problems” for the construction of expedient shelters, Goure 
contended that “evacuation exercises for civil defense personnel had been held in large 
cities such as Leningrad, Kharkov and Novosibirsk.”74 Committee on the Present Danger 
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members like Paul Nitze and Eugene Rostow recommended American government officials 
increase civil defense efforts in the U.S. in order to maintain a strategic balance with the 
Soviet Union and warned of the scenarios that Goure spoke of. 
Goure published the most definitive account of Soviet civil defense plans and 
preparations in 1976. War Survival in Soviet Strategy provides a rare look at the Soviet 
Union’s strategies for nuclear war using extensive Soviet civil defense documents, 
newspapers, and Communist Party sources including pamphlets and training films. 
According to Goure, Soviet approaches towards crisis relocation made a distinction 
between essential workers and the rest of the general population. This logic sprung from 
the “conviction that it is vital to maintain essential production and services, even in 
wartime.”75 Ordinary residents were to proceed with lengthier evacuation procedures 
while essential workers were to disperse between “60-120 km so that the dispersed 
worker will not spend more than 4.5 hours on the round trips to and from work.”76 
Differing from the official concept advocated by the American counterpart FEMA, Soviet 
civil defense strategies clearly had a war-fighting element that geared towards maintaining 
an uninterrupted economy. 
 Soviet civil defense plans permeated the Republic’s citizens as it became part of the 
mandatory Communist indoctrination sessions as early as 1961.77 “The aim”, writes Goure, 
“is to instill in the population a proper attitude towards the civil defense program and also 
to foster patriotism, support for the regime and its policies and an appreciation for what 
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the leadership is doing to ensure the safety of the population.”78 Soviet citizens received 
training for important secondary effects of a nuclear blast such as radiation exposure and 
information was disseminated through all available Communist Party propaganda 
channels. By the mid-1970s districts and cities throughout the USSR held either “a civil 
defense day or month each year.”79 Articles devoted to the subject were published in 
newspapers, training videos were broadcast on national television stations, and exhibits 
and exercises were held which promoted a sense of unity and camaraderie.80  
 American government officials and public concerns over a ‘civil defense gap’ were 
balanced with “persistent skepticism in foreign policy and intelligence circles about the 
scope and effectiveness of the Soviet civil defense effort.”81 Two former American 
ambassadors to Moscow, Malcolm Toon and Thomas Watson, probed Soviet society for 
evidence of preparations while serving abroad. They did not believe the Soviets had an 
effective mechanism in place to shield a major portion of the population from a nuclear 
blast: “The Soviets are very good at establishing lots of bureaus to work on projects that 
never fly,”82 diplomat Thomas Watson stated.  Under the façade, appearances did not seem 
to match realities as Soviet civil defense propaganda was primarily a tool used to keep 
communist party members in check, and a way for workers to demonstrate loyalty to the 
motherland. 
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 As reporter John Finney wrote in the New York Times, the “Soviet Union, with its 
plans for evacuating civilian populations and dispersing industry, was gaining a war-
fighting capability not possessed by the U.S.”83 News of a ‘civil defense gap’ was front page 
on the Los Angeles Times later that year and it helped bring greater national awareness to 
the American people of the urgency of having a civil defense program. A “new civil defense 
debate is developing”, wrote Norman Kempster, “because of concern that the Soviet Union 
maybe opening up a survival gap with its own defensive measures.”84 As one reporter put 
it, “what we don’t want to develop is a situation where only one nation can go underground 
and safely push a button.”85  The cumulative effects of the national debate over an alleged 
‘civil defense gap’ added new energy and resources to the Defense Civil Preparedness 
Agency that had, in the early 1970s, been victim of restrained congressional 
appropriations. In 1979 a near nuclear meltdown at a Pennsylvania power plant captured 
national media attention as news buzzed of a possible mass evacuation. 
The Accident at Three Mile Island 
 On 28 March 1979 a major malfunction occurred at the Three Mile Island II (TMI) 
nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania. The reactor pumps quit working around 4:00am and 
initiated a plethora of problems that culminated with a relief valve tripping and permitting 
“large volumes of cooling water from the primary system to escape. The failure of the relief 
valve was the principal mechanical cause of what soon became a grave crisis at TMI.”86 
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Residents close to the plant had grown accustomed to the loud noises throughout the day 
and night so the “few who were awakened rolled over grumpily and went back to sleep.”87 
According to one newspaper account, the accident at TMI “would generate a week of 
doomsday fear, panicky flight, conflicting statements and intense confusion.”88 Although 
different from a nuclear attack in the sense that it was a product of American enterprise 
gone awry and not a strike from a foreign power, civil defense officials were presented with 
an opportunity to implement crisis relocation plans which had remained in theory and on 
paper. 
      As sociologist Ronald Perry rightly noted, the accident at TMI did not allow for a 
national civil defense exercise because the “event posed a localized threat” and therefore 
“cannot reasonably be seen as an incident providing any substantial part of the population 
with first-hand experience.”89 Only some Pennsylvania residents were affected which left 
the remainder of Americans safe from radiation poisoning and crisis relocation plans were 
therefore unnecessary in forty-nine states during the crisis. Perry also highlighted the 
difference between emergency evacuation plans during a nuclear attack or reactor 
meltdown and natural disasters. In the former the host areas “remain constant”90 and 
highway routes and alternative plans can be developed. With natural disasters 
unpredictability becomes an issue and “safe evacuation routes and destinations must 
change for virtually every impact because of variation in factors like the direction of 
approach of the storm and its intensity.”91 Even though a fraction of Americans did not 
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have a first-hand encounter with a near nuclear disaster in the late Cold War period, TMI 
can be used as a test case to assess the effectiveness of the response from disaster officials 
as well as gaging public reactions to the incident.       
 Mass evacuation of Pennsylvanians to host areas posed a myriad of logistical 
problems but planners within the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) 
remained convinced that it was feasible. However, it would only be ordered if there was 
imminent danger or if radiation amounts exceeded safe levels of exposure. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff and county civil defense officials were forced to sift 
through conflicting reports from the media as well as from TMI operators on the condition 
of the plant. By 30 March 1979 NRC and emergency management authorities grew weary 
“about the condition of the plant and the misleading information about releases of 
radiation convinced them to move quickly on the suddenly urgent question of 
evacuation.”92 The Governor of Pennsylvania, Richard Thornburgh, had the final decision 
whether to issue an evacuation and was not confident that it could be executed.  
As a precautionary measure, Thornburgh issued an evacuation notice for pregnant 
women and children on 31 March 1979 and advised them “to stay at least five miles away 
from the crippled TMI nuclear power plant as radioactivity continued to leak.”93 Thousands 
of schoolchildren accompanied by their mothers were temporarily relocated “ten miles 
southeast of Harrisburg, and other people began leaving on the Governor’s advice.”94 If 
evacuees did not have family or friends to accommodate them, community centers such as 
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the Hershey arena became a temporary home until it was deemed safe enough to return. 
Until then children’s anxieties were soothed with activities as they were treated to a trip 
“to the Hershey Zoo and were entertained with puppet shows, games and television.”95 
Approximately 3, 500 pregnant women and children, 83%, chose to evacuate and most 
women left in a panic with hasty preparations.96 One woman from Harrisburg confessed to 
reporters at the Hershey arena that she had “left home with lunch still on the table for her 
three young children”97 and similar sentiments were expressed from other individuals.  
Jane Lee, a dairy farmer in Etters, PA, “was in a state of panic trying to pack the car” 
and lamented that “it was one hell of a horrible experience to go down that road and look 
back and know you’re never coming back.”98 Lee and her husband braved the warnings of a 
nuclear meltdown and drove back daily to milk and tend to their dairy cows. A Middletown 
resident temporarily evacuated to Maryland for a week to stay with relatives. Pat Street 
decided to leave the children in the care of relatives until the Governor had lifted the 
evacuation advisory.99 Across the Susquehanna River from TMI, Bill Whittock “saw many 
people in town hastily getting ready to vacate” but he was unwilling to travel outside a 
fifteen mile radius because he owned an apartment close to his home.100 Other 
Pennsylvanians either decided to stay put or packed up personal items and waited until 
they received the Governor’s evacuation notice. An editorial printed in the Washington Post 
lambasted the U.S. dependence on nuclear power and asked if Americans could “afford the 
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physiological and psychological costs of nuclear mishaps.”101 Confidence in the state’s 
ability to handle nuclear emergencies was bound to be shaken and the public voiced their 
concerns in the wake of the crisis. Initial reactions to the TMI accident ranged from shock 
and disbelief to confusion as citizens anxiously awaited the possibility of a mass 
evacuation. 
Two days after pregnant women and young children were temporarily evacuated, 
newspaper headlines across the U.S. buzzed with reports of a precautionary mass 
evacuation of Pennsylvanians. The Hartford Courant announced that “six Pennsylvania 
counties were ordered to be prepared for evacuation”102 on 2 April as conflicting reports 
about the magnitude of the disaster continued to contradict each other. PEMA officials 
contemplated expanding the radiation safety zone from five to twenty-five miles which 
increased the number of Americans to be evacuated to an estimated 400, 000 people.103 
The New York Times reported that schools and shopping malls in surrounding cities would 
absorb the influx of evacuees and “some of those who live within 25 miles of the disabled 
Three Mile Island nuclear power plant would be sent as far away as Philadelphia and 
Scranton.”104 One PEMA director exuded confidence that the twenty-five mile radius 
around TMI could be evacuated in a half days’ time: “If Philadelphia can move 35, 000 cars 
in a few hours at a football game we should have no trouble doing it in 12 hours.”105  
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John Brabits, assistant director of emergency preparedness in Dauphin County, 
explained that in the event of a precautionary mass evacuation National Guard trucks, 
buses and other means of transportation would relocate residents, but stressed “if 
everyone follows instructions, we won’t overload highways or cause traffic jams.”106 
Brabits embarrassingly admitted to being caught off guard by the TMI catastrophe but civil 
defense planners in Dauphin County had scrambled to finish evacuation procedures by 31 
March: “we had plans but not for anything of this magnitude.”107 Fortunately for PEMA 
directors the mass precautionary evacuation order for all Pennsylvanians within a twenty-
five mile radius of the TMI nuclear power plant never occurred. The final decision rested 
with Governor Thornburgh and he was hesitant to issue a sweeping emergency 
mobilization advisory because he did not share the same optimistic convictions of 
feasibility as some of his PEMA colleagues. 
According to a Rutgers University study in 1979 by Barnes et al., thirty-three 
percent of people within a twenty mile radius of TMI made preparations to mobilize but 
chose not to.108 The most common reason given for not evacuating “was the inability to 
leave jobs and the absence of an evacuation order.”109 Thornburgh only issued an 
evacuation notice for pregnant women and children within a five mile radius, but the 
twenty-five mile radius around TMI never was ordered to leave. Considering the fact that it 
was not mandatory, most of the residents who temporarily vacated were within a five to 
ten mile radius of TMI. Pennsylvania hospitals fielded calls during the TMI accident from 
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panicked individuals who believed they had radiation poisoning but “not a single case was 
found among central Pennsylvania residents.”110 The complete invisibility of radiation 
particles caused anxious Americans to complain to physicians with symptoms which 
“ranged from a bad taste in their mouths to a mysterious bad smell in the air and erratic 
behaviour by their children.”111 At the peak of the TMI catastrophe nuclear paranoia spread 
to imaginative proportions among those that did not temporarily evacuate.  
A survey by the NRC revealed the breakdown of the percentage of Pennsylvanians 
that evacuated around a fifteen mile radius of the TMI nuclear power plant. Within a five 
mile radius, 60% vacated; within five to ten miles of TMI, 44% departed and in the ten to 
fifteen mile zone, 32% chose to leave.112 According to the survey, respondents indicated the 
primary motive for temporarily relocating “was the confusing information reported about 
the situation. A related reason for leaving voluntarily was the desire to avoid the danger or 
confusion of a forced evacuation.”113 NRC and government officials reassured residents 
throughout the crisis that the radiation threat was overblown and posed no serious 
dangers to public safety. Reports by media outlets offered conflicting accounts and 
highlighted the possibility of a hydrogen bubble explosion which contributed to the publics’ 
anxiety and confusion.  
Pregnant women and children were allowed to return to their homes two weeks 
after the precautionary evacuation after officials “declared the crisis at Three Mile Island 
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over.”114 Schools resumed a few days after the declaration but investigators admitted that it 
would be “months before radioactivity has subsided enough to permit inspection of its 
damaged core.”115 In an interview with reporters from the Hartford Courant weeks after 
the catastrophe had subsided, Governor Thornburgh rejected the notion of issuing a mass 
evacuation order due to the possible dangers as well as traffic jams. Thornburgh remained 
“convinced that a mass evacuation would have resulted in panic and possible injury and 
death especially to the old and sick.”116 This contrasted with PEMA planners as they were 
convinced that if evacuees remained calm and followed civil defense instructions, crisis 
relocation plans would be an effective defense against nuclear mishaps and attacks as well 
as natural disasters.  
It is interesting to note the leniency that existed between nuclear power plant 
licensing and emergency response plans to accidents. The NRC did not require a “state 
emergency plan as a condition of plant licensing, although a state could voluntarily submit 
a plan to NRC for its concurrence.”117 Counties in close proximity to nuclear power plants 
across the U.S. initiated crisis relocation planning “even though plans depended on 
inadequately prepared local communities.”118 Emergency evacuation procedures often 
were treated as an afterthought as they were dependent on funding and the level of 
enthusiasm that civil defense planners held.  
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In January 1978 a nuclear power plant in Ft. St. Vrain, CO accidentally leaked low 
amounts of radioactivity and the response by disaster planners created an embarrassing 
situation. Emergency preparedness plans “called for using school buses to remove the 
area’s adult population en masse”, however, “the officials responsible for carrying out the 
Colorado evacuation had forgotten all about the children.”119 Gaffes reported in 
newspapers revealed that nuclear contingency plans were treated with a low priority. 
Directors responsible for crisis relocation plans accepted the “argument that because of the 
relatively low radiation levels expected from even a major nuclear power plant accident, an 
evacuation could proceed safely without a rush.”120 Such justifications relegated crisis 
relocation plans to the backburner of yearly agendas as emergency planners hoped it 
would be something they would never have to implement. 
Reports on the condition of the TMI nuclear power plant were contradictory 
throughout the two week crisis which greatly contributed to the public’s confusion. Plant 
operators and NRC officials maintained that the threat was under control and the radiation 
emitted posed no serious health risks. Media outlets painted a different scenario and 
speculated about the possible risk of an explosion and the need for a mass evacuation. Civil 
defense authorities admitted to being caught off guard by the initial event but were 
convinced that such an operation was feasible. This contrasted with Governor Thornburgh 
who believed that a forced mass evacuation would generate panic and injuries and 
therefore resisted issuing the order. The vast majority of residents that temporarily 
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relocated were within the ten to fifteen mile radius of the TMI plant. Sentiments expressed 
by evacuees reflected the desire to get out of town to avoid the panic and confusion of an 
evacuation order. After the crisis had subsided and people had returned to their homes, 
serious doubts were raised as confidence in emergency officials’ abilities to effectively 
handle the situation was shaken. Ultimately the legacy of TMI cast a shadow over the civil 
defense establishment as it encouraged Americans to be even more skeptical of crisis 
relocation planning. 
Civil Defense in the Carter Years 
In order to improve the complex and fragmented nature of the DCPA’s ability to 
handle both natural and man-made disasters, President Jimmy Carter established the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 1979 to “succeed and combine several 
disaster services, including the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency under the FEMA 
umbrella.”121 According to historian Dee Garrison, FEMA was “publicized as a group 
devoted to a dual purpose in order to make preparation against nuclear war less 
frightening to the public.”122 Instead of planning solely for a nuclear attack, FEMA officials 
emphasized the similarities of evacuation between preparing for an impending hurricane 
and a nuclear disaster. There is also a more simple explanation as to why FEMA 
consolidated the disparate agencies: cost savings. As Jimmy Carter explained in his remarks 
announcing Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978, “cost savings of between $10-15 million 
annually can be achieved by consolidating headquarters and regional facilities and 
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staffs.”123 Under Reorganization Plan No. 3, FEMA consolidated “five existing Federal 
agencies and six additional disaster-related responsibilities into a single structure…the 
National Fire Prevention and Control Administration and oversight responsibility for the 
Emergency Broadcast System were also transferred to the agency.”124 FEMA not only 
created a more visible awareness among American citizens with regards to the state of civil 
defense preparedness in their state, but also assured that local civil defense officials 
coordinated evacuation plans with areas that became host counties.  
Carter was convinced that consolidating civil defense functions would ensure that 
“attack readiness programs were effectively integrated into the preparedness 
organizations and programs of state and local governments, private industry and volunteer 
organizations.”125 There were, however, reservations among state and local civil defense 
officials about the new agency created by the Carter Administration. As one state director 
remarked, his “major objection to the reorganization plan was his concern that civil 
defense would become subordinate to preparations for natural disasters.”126 The fear was 
that planning for a nuclear attack would not be taken seriously and be shelved in favour of 
planning for more common occurring peacetime disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes 
and floods.  
Conversely, opponents of civil defense within the medical and scientific 
communities maintained that planning for man-made and natural disaster emergencies 
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were so different that they could not be lumped together into a single agency. The main 
concern was the uncertainty of how many survivors would be left after a nuclear blast as 
“most conventional disaster plans rely on the rapid influx of help, in both materiel and 
manpower, from neighbouring regions…the actual responses to nuclear war and non-
nuclear war situations are likely to be very different.”127 The scenario of a nuclear attack 
envisioned by physics specialists painted a bleak picture of mass death with no survivors 
left from any surrounding areas to help out.  
The official concept of civil defense preparations advocated by the Carter 
Administration in the late 1970s was one of mass evacuation of high-risk areas to host 
counties. Evacuees would, in theory, live temporarily with relatives and friends, reside in 
school and church basements or build expedient fallout shelters. For those not living in a 
designated high-risk area, they were expected to either build a make-shift expedient 
shelter or relocate to a community shelter.  
The focus towards crisis relocation plans had an added incentive of a minimum 
requirement of energy and expenditures needed by residents in the high-risk areas of the 
U.S. Unlike the massive price tag of blast shelters that was pegged at upwards of $60 
billion128, the crisis relocation plans would be a fraction of that cost. As reported by the 
Chicago Tribune: “the Carter Administration announced a five year, $1.2 billion program to 
prepare for mass evacuation of cities especially in California, the Northeast corridor and 
the Chicago-Detroit corridor.”129 The main instrument of crisis relocation plans were 
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automobiles as “at least 80 percent of evacuees were expected to relocate in private 
automobiles, effectively putting most of the cost of transport onto evacuees themselves.”130 
The distance that Americans were supposed to travel depended on the geographical 
location and access routes, but was generally less than 250 miles which was the estimate of 
the fuel range on a full tank of gas.131 For those that did not have access to a car, the chief 
means of evacuation would come through public transportation via buses or trains and 
through air travel.  
The plan to evacuate large metropolitan areas such as New York relied on 
commercial airlines and had a skeptical response from an article published in the Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists. “Planners envisioned airlifting up to 1.5 million people in the New 
York area airports to western New York State”, wrote David Cavers, “having tried to get to 
airports late in the afternoon, I consider this concept a triumph of creative imagination.”132 
It was expected that a certain amount of the population would refuse to temporarily 
relocate. This would benefit those who were heading for the hills as the routes would be a 
bit less congested.  
The city of Plattsburgh, New York was one of the areas in the state that actively 
engaged in crisis relocation planning during the late 1970s and into the early 1980s. Due to 
its close proximity to an Air Force Base, the chief emergency evacuation planner in New 
York State, Richard Herskowitz, developed detailed protocols for emergency evacuation in 
cooperation with local civil defense officials.133 Although not completely finished by 1979, a 
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wailing blast from a siren would signal residents to evacuate “to lower-risk portions of 
Clinton County unless they had a vacation cabin, relatives or friends in which they would be 
advised to go there instead…the police department would assign two patrolmen to direct 
traffic at the corner of Broad and Cornelia.”134 Herskowitz’s crisis relocation plan included 
“lodging assignments for evacuees in public and commercial buildings, special 
arrangements for key workers who would commute back to their jobs in Plattsburgh and 
arrangements for the delivery of food and other supplies to the host areas.”135 A House 
member who represented New York, Tom Downey, ridiculed the proposed plan on the 
grounds that planning to survive a nuclear attack was ludicrous: “life as we know it would 
come to an end…we’d be holed up in cellars with machine guns trying to protect five cans 
of tuna fish.”136  
In order to effectively warn residents of an impending disaster, the District of 
Columbia announced in 1978 that the state was taking a proactive stance and updating the 
civil defense warning sirens. As Frances Sauvé reported in the Washington Post, a “wailing 
sound for 3-5 minutes would warn residents to turn on their radios and televisions for 
instructions in the event of a local disaster.”137 In 1978 there were roughly 350 civil 
defense sirens in the D.C. area and residents could expect another 225 sirens installed and 
working by the end of the fiscal year.138 The warning sirens were linked electronically and 
had the unfortunate tendency to malfunction from time to time. In 1985 D.C. residents 
awoke one late May evening to the sound of blaring warning sirens and “within minutes 
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hundreds of concerned residents had tied up telephone lines with queries to their police 
and fire departments.”139 In that instance it turned out to be a false alarm but that did not 
stop the hysteria from reaching some residents in Montgomery County, as one emergency 
response assistant attested: “one woman told me she was really afraid and she wanted to 
know what was happening…I just tried to calm her.”140  
In other cases, some states were not as proactive as D.C. in terms of their emergency 
disaster warning systems and had let maintenance of sirens fall by the waste side. In March 
1985, civil defense officials in Lehigh County, Pennsylvania received a message of an 
impending attack warning on the teletype from AT&T and were about to order the 
Emergency Broadcasting System.141 A malfunction occurred and the message had been 
accidentally sent to 40 of the state’s 67 counties but “20 counties did not verify or sound 
the alarm…in Allentown only 3/7 sirens were in operation…in fact, most people only 
learned of the incident the next day from the newspaper.”142 The false alarm incident in 
Pennsylvania revealed that if a nuclear or natural disaster occurred in the state, the 
apparatus to warn residents was woefully inadequate. 
One concerned individual from Danvers, Massachusetts clamoured for an increased 
effort on the behalf of state and local civil defense officials to prepare for natural or 
wartime disasters. In an editorial in the Boston Globe, local resident Paola Jasper expressed 
her disbelief over the sorry state of emergency preparedness planning and believed that 
“what America puts into her defense budget, Russia puts into her civil defense program. 
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And if there were to be a war, it is known that wars are won by the people who survive 
them.”143 Jasper had good reason to be alarmed. An article that ran a few months prior to 
her editorial in the Boston Globe stated that “California and the Northeast corridor that 
includes New York and Boston are cited as the two most difficult areas for mass 
evacuation…the northern and central sections of Massachusetts would get seven refugees 
for each local inhabitant.”144 Clearly the crisis relocation plans in some parts of the country 
needed a lot more fine tweaking as locales with high concentrations of population posed 
serious problems to emergency mobilization planners.  
Chapter I - Conclusion 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, American civil defense officials employed a 
philosophy of dual-use and instructed citizens to be in a constant state of preparedness for 
both natural and man-made disasters, and to plan for the unthinkable. While the civil 
defense agency remained largely dormant during the Johnson and Nixon era, a new phase 
of Cold War confrontation in the late 1970s and an alleged Soviet ‘civil defense gap’ gave 
extra impetus for civil defense plans and ushered in a wave of civil defense enthusiasm that 
lasted into the early 1980s. There were factors of continuity and change from the civil 
defense agencies in the early to late Cold War period. One element of continuity was the 
notion of “self-help” which put the onus and expense of survival preparations on the 
American people. One aspect of change was the implementation of crisis relocation plans 
which largely replaced the duck and cover and bomb shelter craze of the 1950s and 1960s. 
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 Government officials and civil defense proponents in the late Cold War period 
generally regarded civil defense as providing a credible posture of deterrence vis-à-vis the 
Soviet Union. Enthusiasts on the far Right viewed civil defense in the lens of Mutual 
Assured Destruction and argued a strong program would avoid American capitulation to 
Soviet demands. Professionals in the medical and scientific community condemned civil 
defense efforts as futile and stressed that the post-attack implications were so catastrophic 
that planning to survive one promoted a false sense of security. Civil defense officials 
remained confident that crisis relocation planning was feasible based on everyday practice 
with rush hour and holidays. They emphasized the similarities between planning for 
natural and man-made disasters, but this was met with ridicule from members of the 
medical and scientific community as well as the public. 
The near meltdown at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant caught Pennsylvania civil 
defense planners off guard and the contradictory reports regarding the situation created 
anxious and panicky residents. Civil defense officials were extremely confident that a mass 
evacuation of all Pennsylvanians within a twenty-five mile radius of the plant could be 
done, but this contrasted with the convictions of the only man who had the authority to 
dictate an order. In the end, most of those who left were in close proximity to the accident 
and chose to do so to avoid the confusion and danger of a forced evacuation notice. The 
legacy of Three Mile Island ultimately cast a shadow of doubt over the emergency 
management agency and led to public skepticism over crisis relocation planning. 
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Chapter II - A Final Resurgence: Civil Defense under Reagan 
 Chapter II delves into the reasons as to why civil defense crisis relocation plans 
were outright rejected by American citizens by Reagan’s second term. It looks at civil 
defense activities in the classrooms, corporate America and the White House as the civil 
defense establishment received a boost with the election of Reagan. Proponents framed the 
usefulness of civil defense as providing a credible posture of nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis 
the Soviet Union and likened the concept to a seat belt, fire extinguisher or bullet proof vest 
as a preventative measure. Critics were not convinced of the humanitarian insurance 
argument and believed a strong civil defense program would only provoke the Soviets. It 
includes a discussion of the optimistic assurances by civil defense officials and a member of 
Reagan’s cabinet that preparations would enable survival as well as an examination of the 
scientific and public backlash to civil defense plans through editorial reactions and public 
opinion polls.  
By the early 1980s sentiments expressed by residents like Paola Jasper, regarding 
the civil defense efforts by the Soviet Union, were shared among senior advisors to the 
Reagan Administration and even Ronald Reagan himself. In an interview with Sam 
Donaldson of ABC news in May 1982, President Reagan expressed his inner thoughts and 
fears about a ‘civil defense gap’ between the United States and Soviet Union. “The Soviet 
Union for years has had a very expensive and very efficient civil defense program”, stated 
Reagan, “shelters, evacuation plans, everything…we’ve got to go forward with some plans 
43 
 
for the protection of our own people.”145 When asked about his views over whether the 
American people could protect themselves against a nuclear attack, Reagan was confident 
that there would be adequate warning time to prepare: “there’d have to be enough strain in 
advance that you would think you’d have some warning that you better get the people out. 
There wouldn’t be any protection in that for a surprise attack because you’ve only got 28 
minutes.”146 Although he conceded that in the unlikely event of a surprise attack 
inhabitants would be doomed, the scenario he envisioned included a period of rising 
international tensions followed by an evacuation of Soviet cities which would allow ample 
warning time for American citizens.  
The election of Republican President Ronald Reagan in 1980 signalled a shift in the 
Cold War as Reagan adopted a more bellicose stance and labelled the Soviet Union as an 
“evil empire.”147 Reagan rode to power on the message that “government is not the solution 
to our problem; government is the problem.”148 Encouraging public cynicism towards 
government created a contradiction when expecting the public to be receptive to 
government initiated civil defense planning. In the realm of nuclear war and public opinion, 
a poll conducted by the National Broadcasting Company in mid-December 1981 found that 
“76 percent of the American people believed that nuclear war was likely within a few years, 
an increase from 57 percent the preceding August.”149  
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One tangible example that measured societal anxiety with regards to nuclear 
weaponry throughout the Cold War was referred to as the “doomsday clock.” Prominent 
members of the medical and scientific communities formed an influential group known as 
the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 
1945. Upon its inception, members created a “doomsday clock” in order to gage fear and 
tension in American society. They took into account factors such as international crises and 
events as well as the nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States. If 
the minute hand of the clock was placed closer to midnight scientists warned of a possible 
impending international conflagration. 
By the early 1980s the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists had moved the “doomsday 
clock” to three minutes to midnight due to “the accelerating arms race and the almost 
complete breakdown of communication between the superpowers…this has combined to 
create a situation of extreme and immediate danger.”150 In fact, the only time the minute 
hand had been placed closer was in 1953 after the United States successfully detonated the 
first hydrogen bomb.151 By the mid-1980s the scientific community had reacted to the 
gravity of the international situation and had negative perceptions regarding prospects for 
peace. Therefore the fear that was shared among high level officials within the Reagan 
Administration was reflected among prominent individuals within the scientific 
community. Within this backdrop of deepening nuclear tensions, grass-root Americans 
were exposed to these fears and they were taught to defend themselves against a possible 
nuclear attack. 
                                                          
150
 The Editors, “Three Minutes to Midnight,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January 1984), 2. 
151
 Ibid. 
45 
 
Classroom Civil Defense: Say Goodbye to Bert the Turtle 
Conditioning Americans to placate themselves against an enemy attack ultimately 
meant starting from the ground up. In other words, this meant implementing curriculum 
changes in the nation’s elementary and secondary schools. This next section deals with the 
receptivity of public opinion in the push to include civil defense education as part of a 
standard curriculum, as well as the reactions by school teachers and the press. In 1973 a 
DCPA annual report noted that all states except Kentucky and Rhode Island had active civil 
defense education programs. This produced the following results: a total of “900, 872 
pupils completed a personal and family survival course of 8 hours or more. An additional 
1,542,543 pupils completed from 1-8 hours of instruction in DCPA publications…school-
oriented workshops were held with a total attendance of 11, 817 teachers.”152 Efforts by 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency continued to target the nation’s school 
curriculum in the 1980s. In the 1983 annual report the agency boasted of an “increase in 
the number of courses offered by the Emergency Management Institute and a 57% increase 
in the number of students who participated in training activities.”153 Besides encountering 
civil defense in the classrooms, students could enroll in free courses offered through 
regional or state offices. In 1983 over 100,000 students participated.154 
Civil defense officials maintained that training students to deal with the prospects of 
surviving a nuclear attack was an important element as it was hoped that pupils would 
return home and share their advice with their parents. Even Nobel Prize winner Dr. Eugene 
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Wigner supported civil defense efforts in the schools and advocated for the inclusion of 
high school courses in the nation’s curriculum. An article in the New York Times informed 
readers that Wigner “suggested training two teachers in each of the nation’s 29,500 
secondary schools to conduct the courses”155 The curriculum would teach high school 
students the protocols and procedures of crisis relocation planning in an impending 
nuclear attack or other natural disaster. In order for that to occur, school administrators 
had to believe in the usefulness of civil defense education and certain amount of receptivity 
needed to exist within the American public.  
A survey conducted in the fall of 1984 in Greensboro, North Carolina “assessed the 
knowledge and attitudes toward nuclear war” among high school students and college 
freshman.156 When posed the question over whether pupils “would want to be among the 
survivors after a nuclear attack, only 41 percent of high school students and 19 percent of 
college students responded affirmatively.”157 Although this was a relatively small sample of 
survey respondents, the vast majority of North Carolina’s youth indicated that in the event 
of an enemy attack, they would rather be among the dead than those living. Clearly civil 
defense educational activities needed to be ramped up in certain sections of the country to 
impart a greater level of confidence amidst students that preparations would enable 
survival.  
By the early 1980s a large portion of FEMA’s work consisted of public awareness 
campaigns and cajoling the American public into adopting emergency preparedness 
                                                          
155
 Associated Press, “Nobel Winner Urges Schools to Teach More Civil Defense,” The New York Times (October 11, 
1981), 66. 
156
 Richard L. Zweigenhaft, “Students Surveyed About Nuclear War,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (February  
1985), 26.  
157
 Ibid, 27. 
47 
 
preparations. This was a logical extension for the civil defense agency as much of their 
planning depended upon willingness by Americans to follow their lead. “This focus” write 
scientists Jennifer Leaning and Matthew Leighton, “derives from its emphasis on 
influencing popular perceptions about nuclear war and prospects for survival.”158 By the 
end of the Reagan Administration’s first term, FEMA’s efforts had paid off as a pilot 
program introduced an emergency management curriculum in nearly half of the U.S. states 
and plans were announced for a nationwide program in 1984. An article in the Nuclear 
Times in January 1983 provided an overview of the pilot program curriculum for those in 
grades kindergarten through grade 12. As reporter R. Burd noted, a “program covering 
natural disasters, technological disasters and nuclear disasters of various types was field 
tested in 22 states during 1981-1982.”159 FEMA planned to expand the program to all fifty 
U.S. states during the 1984 school year.  
What were some of the initial reactions among teachers and administrators as well 
as the press? Reporter Paul Loeb was optimistic of the youth pilot program as he felt that 
the “nuclear curricula for junior high schools confronts the issue head on. They discuss 
what nuclear war would be like, how the weapons buildup has come about and our options 
for preventing catastrophe.”160 For example, young primary school children “should 
determine the location of fallout shelters in their town and practice emergency drills” but 
“it is not suggested that children practice how to duck and cover.”161 The popular notion to 
duck and cover during the 1950s and 1960s was replaced in favour of crisis relocation 
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planning. Civil defense films promoted this notion with a lovable character named Bert the 
Turtle and advised children to duck and cover in the event of an atomic attack. In the 1980s 
the curriculum material was divided into four sections according to grade level and had a 
skeptical response from scientist Jennifer Leaning who looked at the content in teacher’s 
manuals in the junior grades. She concluded that an “incomplete and optimistic assessment 
pervades the curriculum. Nuclear war is presented as one more in a series of manageable 
disasters along with earthquakes and hurricanes.”162 Leaning expressed her disdain for the 
overly optimistic advice presented in FEMA teaching manuals as she did not believe that 
planning for natural and man-made disasters were similar.   
FEMA’s education specialist, Jim Bunton, described the curriculum as a 
“comprehensive all disasters approach” and claimed that “an overwhelming majority of the 
teachers [in the pilot program] found the curriculum to be good.”163 Leaning’s pessimism 
was echoed among some of the teachers who participated in the pilot program. Betsy 
Schultz, a high school science teacher in Oakland, California remarked that the “information 
regarding nuclear war is totally unrealistic…nuclear war is just another disaster the way it 
is presented.”164 As a result she “declined to use the nuclear war section of the curriculum” 
for the 1983-1984 school year.165 Thus by the mid-1980s a certain level of disconnect 
between civil defense officials and American educators was apparent. For those expected to 
implement the plans and activities on behalf of the civil defense agency, the confidence and 
enthusiasm levels in survival plans among the grass roots did not match that of civil 
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defense officials. This lack of confidence in civil defense plans contrasted with the boom in 
nuclear preparations among elite government politicians and corporate America in the 
Reagan years.  
Civil Defense in Corporate America and the White House  
How did businesses and corporations as well as high level government officials plan 
for an enemy nuclear attack? In 1979, Ronald Reagan was “invited to visit the headquarters 
of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) in Cheyenne Mountain, 
Colorado.”166 According to Reagan’s memoirs he was “incredibly shaken by the Cheyenne 
Mountain experience, and by the fact that there was nothing that could prevent a Soviet 
nuclear attack.”167 This experience weighed heavily on the President’s conscience and 
personally reminded him of the importance of having civil defense plans in the White 
House.  
The Federal Emergency Management Agency had a detailed and highly secretive 
continuity of government plan that has remained largely classified to the present day. The 
purpose of this plan was to “provide for the rescue and shelter of top government officials, 
industrial and military leaders during a nuclear war to ensure that selected American elite 
could continue to direct and ‘win’ a protracted nuclear conflict.”168 Also known as Project 
908, the continuity of government plan was labelled the “Doomsday Project” by a journalist 
who uncovered portions of the plan in the late 1980s.  
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In 1981 President Reagan signed a “secretive Executive Order that paid special 
attention to presidential succession and involved measures to protect the President…a  
shadow war cabinet was created that could assume power if the President was killed.”169 
Seventeen top-ranked military and government officials were constantly “tracked through 
a computer database and at least one of them was supposed to remain outside the 
Washington, D.C. periphery at all times.”170 According to the U.S. News and World Report 
journalist who uncovered Project 908 in 1989, intelligence sources “admitted that there 
had been more than a dozen occasions during 1982-1989 when all of the officials had been 
within 2 miles of each other in the capital.”171 Clearly in the case of Presidential succession, 
expedience had trumped preparations due to the importance of high level government 
officials still needing to conduct the daily affairs of the country.  
Another option contained in the continuity of government called for the evacuation 
of the President, Cabinet and Supreme Court to the 434 acre mountain facility located 48 
miles from Washington in Berryville, Virginia: Mt. Weather.172 Completed under the 
Eisenhower Administration in the late 1950s, the massive underground bunker was 
complete with a hospital, dining and recreation areas, a crematorium, an emergency power 
plant and reservoirs of drinking water.173 The site was so secretive that it only became 
public knowledge in the late 1980s and early 1990s and “archived records pertaining to it 
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remain classified and nothing is accessible regarding its use during exercises.”174 The 
continuity of government plan was designed to give the President survival options in the 
event of an impending nuclear attack. In case that failed, those designated to succeed the 
Presidency would be provided with the tools and resources necessary to both launch a 
retaliatory strike vis-à-vis the Soviet Union as well as carry on the functions to maintain the 
economy in the aftermath of a nuclear disaster.  
There was yet another option for the White House in Project 908. National 
Emergency Airborne Command Posts (NEACP) were set up in which specially retrofitted 
Boeing 747’s were available to the President on fifteen minutes notice.175 These airborne 
posts provided the President or successor with command over nuclear forces from the air 
during a crisis but could only remain aloft for 72 hours.176 There are some inconsistencies 
within the available documents pertaining to the feasibility of NEACP’s being able to 
remain in airspace longer than three days. While historian Steven Schwartz claimed a 
maximum airborne time of 72 hours, reporter Steven Emerson stated that “with refueling, 
the NEACP could remain airborne almost indefinitely, allowing the President to direct a 
military reprisal and coordinate emergency relief efforts.”177 The scenario that Emerson 
envisioned foresaw another 747 refueling the NEACP while mid-air thus allowing for an 
extended period of emergency operation. Continuity of government plans were top secret 
and remained out of the realm of public knowledge to allay fears of an American war-ready 
image. 
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The Reagan Administration was careful to balance a vision of “peace through 
strength” with concerns over public opinion with a trigger-happy President. Defense 
Department officials contemplated an extended war with the Soviet Union and their 
satellites beyond the exchange of a singular nuclear weapon. According to Richard 
Halloran, a reporter with the New York Times, the Pentagon drew up its first strategy to 
fight a nuclear war and directed the “armed forces to prepare for nuclear counter-attacks 
against the Soviet Union over a protracted period.”178 On the other hand, the General 
Services Administration’s purchase of 10, 000 pounds of morphine sulfate was delayed in 
January 1983 by the Reagan Administration “in part out of concern about public fears that 
the U.S. might be prepared to wage a limited nuclear war.”179 Morphine sulfate would be 
one of many drugs used to help victims of radiation sickness in a post-attack aftermath and 
was “among the half-dozen drugs stored in the strategic stockpile for civil defense.”180 With 
the nuclear freeze movement gathering momentum by 1983 and 1984 being a presidential 
election, the Reagan camp was cautious to please a diverse political spectrum while seeking 
a second term. 
Russell Clanahan, a spokesman for FEMA, discussed the agency’s justification for the 
continuity of government plan: “You have to have a place to protect the leadership, the 
decision-makers, so that they will be able to continue the operation of state and local 
government after a nuclear attack.”181 In one way or another, FEMA officials believed the 
command posts were a crucial element in the event of a nuclear attack but an article in the 
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Christian Science Monitor in May 1986 called into question the morality of civil defense 
proponents. As reported by the Associated Press, a $1.5 billion proposal to set up special 
command posts “generated controversy as the posts would protect government officials 
but the public would not be able to receive this same kind of protection.”182 What purpose 
would it serve to protect and plan for the continuity of government if civil defense officials 
did not expect there to be survivors to govern? For the rest of the American populace, 
important questions still needed to be answered in the realm of the post-attack aftermath. 
Private American companies capitalized on the nuclear paranoia of the late Cold War 
period and offered services to citizens hoping to survive nuclear Armageddon. 
In the early 1980s some corporations took part in civil defense planning but this 
occurred among only a fragment of the American business community. At the Federal level, 
the Federal Reserve Board constructed a vault out of reinforced concrete in the early 1970s 
at Mt. Pony, near Culpepper, Virginia.183 In the event of an enemy attack, the “gigantic vault 
held billions of dollars to replace currency lost in a nuclear war.”184 With currency saved it 
was expected that commerce and the economy would resume functions if they had a vital 
monetary supply.  
The United States Postal Service planned to “distribute emergency change of 
address cards” if an attack were to occur on American soil and this “postage-free card 
would be used by displaced survivors to notify the Postal Service of their emergency 
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mailing address.”185 In the private sector, the American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) 
Company created shelters for top executives and “space for a three-storey building was 
chiseled from granite and the nerve center was buried 70 feet underground outside 
Netcong, New Jersey.”186 The nation’s telephone apparatus would remain in-tact if a pre-
emptive strike came from the Soviet Union. Boeing Company also took civil defense 
preparations seriously as they “experimented with protecting equipment by packing sand 
and crushable materials around it.”187 Corporate level civil defense was by no means a 
widespread practice in the business community during the early 1980s. 
Across America about a “dozen firms were created which offered document 
preservation vaults for companies concerned about preserving vital records through a 
nuclear attack.”188 These companies were a product of the time period as they capitalized 
on the ratcheting up of Cold War tensions between the U.S. and Soviet Union. Developers 
too took advantage of the anxieties that existed among the American public as “one 
developer in LaVerkin, Utah built 240 underground condominiums complete with outdoor 
scenes painted on the windows.”189 Lane Blackmore named the development Terrene Ark I 
and recorded over 65 sales by 1982.190 He explained that the types of Americans who were 
investing in the condominiums were not the typical hard-core survivalists: “I’m getting 
doctors and lawyers in here, not kooks. These are really quite prudent people who know 
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how to live in the nuclear age.”191 It is difficult to determine just how many residents went 
to extreme lengths to prepare themselves for nuclear war, but the logic behind this 
instance was to provide a tranquil atmosphere for those inhabitants who had retreated 
underground.  
A company known as Biosphere Corp. offered a “$30, 000 fiberglass, egg-shaped 
living unit designed to outlast the pyramids.”192 Although they admitted they had yet to sell 
one, Americans who were willing to foot the bill had access to extensive and expensive civil 
defense preparations that could, in theory, stand the test of time. These types of heavy duty 
blast-resistant shelters were financially out of reach for the average American family as 
only wealthy citizens could invest in a post-nuclear future.  
By the early 1980s civil defense preparations became an industry as private 
companies offered “the business of survival.”193 The President of New World Survival 
Company, which specialized in pre-fabricated shelters, claimed that 1983 has “undoubtedly 
got to be the best year we’ve had…I think next year is going to be much better.”194 Survive 
magazine, which eventually would become Survival Tomorrow, offered a monthly 
newsletter subscription that covered all aspects of appropriate survival measures. 
Although not officially sanctioned by government agencies such as FEMA, Survive monthly 
garnered a membership of 20,000 subscriptions and a “total circulation of 80, 000 
issues.”195  
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Edward Murray, Deputy Director of Civil Defense for Baltimore County, built his 
egg-shaped cement bomb shelter in the 1960s but felt it was necessary to have in the 
1980s. While unused for many years, Murray commented that “it’s up to the individual to 
do something because government isn’t doing it at the moment.”196 While frustrated with a 
lack of financial resources to effectively perform his duties, he maintained that there was 
the possibility of surviving a thermonuclear war. Murray remained unconvinced by the 
“warnings of Jonathan Schell and others that such a war could bring on a nuclear winter 
and finish off the human species.”197 To civil defense officials, as long as Americans planned 
for the unthinkable, preparations and a detailed plan of attack were the keys to survival. 
The Final Push: Scientists and the American Public Backlash  
To symbolize a strong support for an invigorated American civil defense program, 
the Reagan Administration’s fiscal year 1983 civil defense request was for “$252 million 
presented as the first year of a seven-year enhanced program, estimated to require 
expenditures of about $4.2 billion through fiscal year 1989.”198 As released in a statement 
by FEMA, the agency planned to rely on the extensive transportation infrastructure to 
“relocate the population of metropolitan and other potential high-risk areas to surrounding 
areas of lower risk during a period of international crisis.”199 Unfortunately members of 
Congress appropriated a fraction of the administration’s request to the tune of $147.8 
million and “sent a strong message that they were opposed to the plan on the grounds that 
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it was part of a war-fighting strategy.”200 Congress interpreted FEMA’s intentions as 
increasing the chances of a nuclear confrontation if the President had an effective 
mechanism to protect substantial portions of the American people. 
The debacle in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal created tension between the 
legislative and executive branch of the United States government as well as deep public 
mistrust in American politicians. Henry Kissinger commented on the political climate in the 
post-Vietnam and Watergate era: “There was an extreme attack on general principles of 
authority and, in particular, on the Defense establishment.”201 By the mid-1970s, public 
support for an American-Soviet confrontation simply did not exist. Members of Congress 
reinforced those views by cutting budget requests and investigated “intelligence operations 
to unprecedented scrutiny.”202 The deep tensions between the legislative and executive 
branch created by Vietnam and Watergate were felt under the Reagan Administration.    
A look at a pamphlet released by FEMA in 1982 reveals the responsibilities and 
activities surrounding the agency in the early years of the Reagan Administration. The eight 
page pamphlet describes its primary activities as “coordinating civil emergency 
preparedness for nuclear attack, nuclear power plant accidents, earthquakes, floods, 
hurricanes and tornadoes…and supporting state and local governments in a wide range of 
disaster planning, preparedness and recovery efforts.”203 This included educational and 
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training programs to enhance the quality of federal, state and county civil defense officials 
as well as direct federal support in terms of funding, supplies and equipment.204  
A good example of FEMA’s civil defense public awareness campaign occurred in 
September 1983 in Saratoga Springs, New York. The Saratoga County Fairgrounds were 
rented to hold “civil defense Olympics” in which “several hundred people turned out for 
what was both a festive occasion with music and refreshments and a serious gathering with 
an educational and political purpose.”205 Civil defense officials injected a bit of fun into a 
subject that typically caused apprehension among Americans as “seventeen teams 
completed in a series of events such as expedient shelter construction, duck and cover 
relay and relocation obstacle courses.”206 Efforts to cajole Americans to take planning for a 
nuclear disaster seriously paid off when citizens were allowed to have fun while learning 
practical tips that could enable survival. 
Although assisting state and local civil defense directors in the development and 
implementation of crisis relocation plans comprised most of FEMA’s efforts, additional 
activities included the “resumption of selective shelter marking as well as work to provide 
a basis for future procurement of shelter supplies and ventilation kits.”207 Residents who 
temporarily relocated to host areas in the countryside could expect to stay there for a 
couple weeks until radiation levels had been deemed safe enough to return, so provision of 
food and water supplies was of utmost importance to the surviving populations.  
                                                          
204
 Ibid, 4. 
205
 Barry M. Casper, “The Best Offense: Civil Defense?” Nuclear Times (Vol. 2, No. 2, November/December 1983), 
26. 
206
 Ibid. 
207
 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Backgrounder: FY 1983 Civil Defense Program,” (Washington: Office 
of Public Affairs, March 12, 1982), 29. 
59 
 
FEMA exuded confidence that a surprise nuclear attack was extremely unlikely as 
“radio reports will probably warn you that you have between 60-90 minutes to prepare for 
a nuclear attack. Probably the most likely is a situation where the warning of expected 
nuclear confrontation is given several days before any weapons are detonated.”208 The 
agency was also optimistic that effective crisis relocation plans “could add over 100 million 
survivors to the 70 million likely to survive anyway. This program could enable survival of 
roughly 80 percent of the U.S. population in a heavy attack.”209 This eighty percent survival 
figure was repeatedly cited by FEMA officials, but derided by civil defense opponents as 
completely unrealistic.   
A pamphlet released in February 1981 dedicated solely to crisis relocation planning 
included a hypothetical scenario of a one megaton airburst attack. Within thirteen 
kilometers of the blast area, “houses suffer severe damage but most people in home 
basements at that distance would be uninjured,”210 the authors claimed. Within fourteen 
and a half kilometres of the blast area, “people in the open would suffer significant burn 
injuries…however, one would expect all evacuees to be in shelter at time of attack.”211 
According to FEMA, as long as the American people were actively engaged with their state 
and local civil defense officials, the mechanisms for survival would enable a substantial 
percentage of the United States population to be saved. 
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T.K. Jones and the Shovel Controversy 
An official within the Reagan Administration, Thomas K. Jones, was among those 
who believed that American civil defense efforts were crucial in order to survive a nuclear 
attack. Appointed by Reagan as Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Research and 
Engineering, Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, Jones claimed in an 1981 interview that 
the “United States could fully recover from an all-out nuclear war with the Soviet Union in 
just two to four years.”212 Jones firmly believed that all the American people needed was a 
shovel because “if there are enough shovels to go around, everybody’s going to make it. It’s 
the dirt that does it.”213 Robert Scheer explained that the purpose of the shovels was for 
digging expedient shelters in the countryside to which three feet of dirt should be piled on 
top.214 Such rhetoric coming from a high level official within the Reagan Administration 
severely alarmed Scheer and he published excerpts of the interview in the Los Angeles 
Times and into a book the following year.  
In that sense millions of readers were exposed to assurances from an official within 
the Reagan Administration that even the most basic, primitive civil defense mechanisms 
could enable survival. Jones believed that a strong and effective civil defense program 
within the United States would deter the Soviet Union from launching a nuclear attack. His 
rationale derived from the “choice between whether to make the Russians as vulnerable as 
we are or to make ourselves as survivable as they are.”215 With the former it would entail 
building more nuclear arms which would drive up the national debt. The cheaper 
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alternative to overpowering the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal, Jones believed, would come 
through the protection of American citizens as “it is better to spend a little money to save a 
lot of Americans than to be forced to spend a lot more money to build more weapons.”216 In 
response to a question posed by Scheer over which nation would have an easier time 
evacuating high-risk population centers, Jones believed that the upper hand lay with the 
United States. “It would be a lot easier to evacuate the American population”, stated Jones, 
“given the much greater number of motor vehicles, vastly superior highway systems, and 
summer homes and motels in the countryside to accommodate the urban refugees.”217 He 
also pointed to the harsh winter conditions that existed in the Soviet Union for longer 
periods than the United States and did not think Soviet citizens would be able to dig 
expedient shelters in the frozen dirt. 
 A look at public opinion polls in the early 1980s provides a glimpse into the 
American people’s receptivity towards an expanded civil defense program and their 
prospects of surviving a nuclear attack. Taken in context with optimistic assessments of 
survival by such government officials as T.K. Jones, the confidence exuded from civil 
defense proponents did not trickle down to the American people. A poll conducted in 1981 
by Dr. Jiri Nehnevajsa of the University of Pittsburgh showed that a majority did not think 
there would be enough evacuation time, but did not want to cease with civil defense 
activities. While sixty-five percent of respondents did not think there would be enough 
time to evacuate in a nuclear alert, only eleven percent wanted the civil defense 
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establishment dismantled.218 Furthermore, Gallup polls exposed that a substantial portion 
of American citizens agreed with Reagan and Jones’ view that American civil defense 
served largely as a deterrent vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. A poll in September 1982 
confirmed this as “75 percent of all adult Americans believe a buildup of our civil defense 
program would help make war less likely.”219 The American people thought that a strong 
civil defense program would force the Soviets to abandon a pre-emptive nuclear strike. 
Civil Defense and Nuclear Deterrence 
To emphasize the usefulness of civil defense as a deterrent, FEMA officials and civil 
defense advocates likened the concept as an analogy comparable to seat belts in a car or 
fire extinguishers in homes. As the influential scientist Edward Teller argued: “seat belts do 
not deter automobile accidents nor can extinguishers deter fires. They only reduce the 
severity of the consequences… the absence of a civil defense program only adds to the 
probability of war.”220 The article helped clarify that while complete population protection 
was too idealistic, crisis relocation planning would “save millions of lives and prevent 
unnecessary suffering.”221 Teller expressed confidence in crisis relocation planning through 
America’s superior transportation infrastructure and everyday practice by motorists 
during rush hour. He wrote that “we experience considerable evacuation of our cities in a 
few disorderly hours every holiday weekend without the benefit of planning or one-way 
exit traffic on major roadways.”222 To critics who did not think emergency evacuation was 
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feasible, Teller pointed out that both the incoming and outgoing lanes of highways would 
be used in an emergency which would facilitate an orderly dispersal of vehicles.  
Another analogy put forward by civil defense enthusiasts to prove the point of 
deterrence was that of a bullet proof vest to improve chances of survival. Charlie Martin, a 
reporter with the Washington Post, compared Soviet and American adversaries as each 
holding a gun but “one of them dons a bulletproof vest which improves his chance of 
survival…this does not make a shootout more likely…there is less incentive to attack a 
nation that has a protected population. All civil defense can do is save lives.”223 Cloaked 
with analogies, civil defense as a seat belt, extinguisher or vest drove home the point that it 
would lessen the chances of nuclear war from happening and would save American lives. 
There were critics that questioned the logic of civil defense as a nuclear deterrent 
vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. John Lamperti, a member of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
suggested that a large-scale civil defense program would increase the chances of a nuclear 
war as it could be perceived as a form of provocation. Taking aim at the “humanitarian 
insurance argument”, Lamperti argued that “a civil defense program could, by increasing 
the probability of war, result in more, rather than less, danger to the population it is 
intended to protect.”224 Contrary to Charlie Martin’s vest analogy, Lamperti believed that a 
nation with a bullet-proof vest would act more dangerously. To some critics, a strong and 
well organized civil defense program was viewed with caution as it had the ability to 
provoke the Soviets and increase the likelihood of nuclear Armageddon.   
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Louis Giuffrida, director of FEMA during the first term of Reagan’s presidency, had a 
vested interest in promoting national civil defense efforts but believed that emergency 
mobilization planning was useful simply due to a lack of other alternatives. To critics of 
crisis relocation planning, Guiffrida countered that the “alternative to a planned and 
controlled evacuation from a perceived nuclear attack would be an uncontrolled and 
enormously disruptive movement out of cities.”225 With a plan in place, a lot of the initial 
chaos would be removed as citizens would know exactly where to go and what to do. 
Furthermore Giuffrida noted that emergency planning would not be in vain as similarities 
existed between plans for natural and man-made disasters. Wastefulness was not the issue, 
in his opinion, as the “techniques, plans and resources that would be employed in the event 
of a nuclear attack have been developed for much more immediate and predictable 
emergencies that imperil segments of the American public almost on a daily basis.”226 So 
although planning for a nuclear attack seemed unthinkable as such an event had not 
occurred in the U.S., Americans were instructed to plan for more frequent disasters such as 
hurricanes and tornadoes and replicate those plans if the Soviet Union ever decided to 
launch a pre-emptive strike.  
The Death of Crisis Relocation Plans 
Crisis relocation plans were not without detractors. Critics of emergency 
mobilization planning generally attacked proposals as naïve and overly optimistic 
assessments that did not take into account realistic scenarios of the post-attack world. One 
flaw pointed out by civil defense opponents revolved around assurances that the U.S. 
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would have ample warning time to evacuate cities: “an obvious faulty assumption is the 
idea that Americans would have several days to evacuate its high risk areas.”227 If a 
surprise attack were to occur, plans in place for evacuating would be thrown out the 
window. Another critique directed at FEMA included their assumption that people fleeing 
the cities in the face of a nuclear attack would be calm, cool and collected. Detractors 
painted pictures of mass panic and chaos as “our government can hardly expect that a mass 
exodus from the cities could take place calmly and expeditiously.”228 Additional concerns 
sprang from FEMA’s logic that temporary relocated populations would survive in a host 
area in the countryside because “there is no reason to believe the host areas would be 
relatively free from radioactivity.”229 The view that the countryside would be safe from 
secondary effects like radiation was not shared among skeptics who felt that there would 
be fatal amounts of fallout in all parts of the country. 
Depending on what part of Massachusetts people lived in, residents were assigned 
to host areas in various parts of the countryside in Maine and New Hampshire. The chief 
director of civil defense efforts in Maine, Rudolph Landry, was unsure how host areas were 
expected to cope with the influx of fleeing populations. For example, after the president 
announced a nuclear emergency, “Sandy Zeamer is supposed to leave her apartment in the 
Beacon Hill section of Boston and head for Litchfield, Maine…in a recent interview with 
Rudolph Landry; he says he hopes she brings a tent.”230 The capacity to absorb additional 
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segments of American citizens into host areas was questioned by local civil defense officials 
as accommodations were likely to be overcrowded with their own residents.  
An editorial published in the Boston Globe and reprinted in the Washington Post 
spoke to the illusions that Massachusetts inhabitants felt with evacuation to such host 
areas as Laconia, New Hampshire. “In case of nuclear warning”, wrote Ellen Goodman, “I 
am to calmly pack my car with a list of essential items…I am to drive in a leisurely way to 
Laconia, N.H where the people will be eagerly awaiting my arrival along with the rest of the 
fleeing urban hordes.”231 This tongue-in-cheek reaction showed the utter disbelief that 
some American people felt towards their states crisis relocation plans. Goodman went on 
to explain that part of her resistance towards emergency evacuation stemmed from the 
“illusions of surviving a nuclear war” as well as the presentation of material in pamphlets 
and films by FEMA officials. After browsing through FEMA booklets, Goodman “couldn’t 
decide whether to giggle or shiver. The calm, chatty description of how to survive a nuclear 
war with just a touch of inconvenience is the logic of madness.”232 Although this was one 
reaction to emergency mobilization, resistance to planning for a nuclear catastrophe 
pervaded mostly among high-risk areas in which large concentrations of urban populations 
rejected the feasibility of crisis relocation plans.  
Medical and scientific professionals across the United States condemned civil 
defense efforts as futile and stressed the post-attack implications that they believed were 
neglected by FEMA directors. The largest and most influential group of medical 
professionals to weigh in on the issue of civil defense was the Physicians for Social 
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Responsibility (PSR). A symposium was held on 17-18 November 1980 in California to 
discuss the consequences of nuclear weaponry and featured “several prominent physicists 
and arms controllers who spoke on civil defense impractibilities and the insanity of nuclear 
war.”233 The symposium was released as a film the following year and the general message 
of the conference stated that “nuclear war would inevitably lead to death, disease and 
suffering of epidemic proportions…treatment programs would be virtually useless and the 
costs would be staggering.”234 A large segment of the film was devoted to Jack Geiger’s 
hypothetical account of what would happen if a one megaton nuclear bomb exploded “over 
downtown San Francisco in the fall on a clear day, on a working day, a Monday at 3pm…in 
short let’s say today, now, at this moment.”235 Geiger claimed that with San Francisco’s 
population of roughly three million people, 780, 000 would be killed outright while there 
would be over one million casualties.236  
In regards to civil defense planning, Geiger looked to the experience of Hamburg 
residents during the Second World War and concluded “the only people who survived were 
those who fled their shelters. For those who stayed the shelters simply turned into 
crematoriums with temperatures that exceeded 780 degrees centigrade.”237 The prospects 
of medical intervention were grim as “physicians and hospitals would be destroyed as they 
are concentrated in downtown urban areas. If every physician spent ten minutes on each 
patient at work for 20 hours a day it would be eight days before every injured person 
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would be seen by a physician.”238 He also took into account the fact that there would be 
minimal supplies to work with and likely no electricity. Geiger received a raucous applause 
from the audience when he delivered his closing remarks that “any physician who even 
takes part in so-called emergency medical disaster planning specifically to meet the 
problem of a nuclear attack is committing a profoundly unethical act.”239 To members of 
the scientific and medical communities, a nuclear attack was so catastrophic that planning 
to survive one promoted a false sense of security among American citizens. 
By the mid-1980s high-risk areas identified by FEMA as the hardest to evacuate 
began to reject participation in civil defense efforts, specifically crisis relocation plans in 
the event of a nuclear attack. In response, Julius Becton, head of FEMA, insisted that “any 
state government that refused to practice civil defense drills in preparation for nuclear 
attack would lose its federal funds for other emergencies such as hurricanes, floods and 
earthquakes.”240 The state of Massachusetts called their bluff in 1986 when Governor 
Michael Dukakis “notified FEMA that they would not take part in attack preparedness 
planning but received a full share of funding for all emergency disasters in fiscal year 
1987.”241 Other states with high concentrations of urban populations followed suit and 
California “became one of the first states to pass a law forbidding the use of state funds for 
crisis relocation planning as defense against nuclear war.”242 New York City also opted out 
of nuclear emergency evacuation planning but Russell Clanahan, a FEMA spokesman, 
asserted that “changes in agency plans had forced a new emphasis on planning to handle a 
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wide range of natural and technological disasters rather than nuclear war.”243 Whatever 
the case, planning specifically for a nuclear war in the mid-1980s began to be seriously 
questioned by areas with the highest concentrations of urban populations. 
A look at letters to the editor within various newspapers in the 1980s sheds light on 
public attitudes towards the receptivity of civil defense plans. One resident of Costa Mesa, 
California expressed his desire for an open discussion on civil defense preparations with 
arguments presented from both sides of the debate: “Is James Alexander of the State Office 
of Emergency Services afraid that a reputable and knowledgeable group, such as the 
Physicians for Social Responsibility, will present valid reasons for questioning the 
feasibility of civil defense in a nuclear war?”244 An open forum with a panel of experts 
representing the civil defense establishment, as well as the anti-civil defense camp, would 
allow attendees to make an informed decision as to whether they would support 
emergency preparedness efforts. Unfortunately for civil defense officials, opportunities to 
engage curious Americans through informational sessions remained fairly limited since the 
1983 fiscal appropriations for civil defense was a mere eleven percent of the total Federal 
Emergency Management Agency budget.245  
 On the topic of Mutual Assured Destruction and the likelihood of winning a nuclear 
war, editorials from concerned residents ranged from maintaining or escalating the arms 
race to expressions of apathy. P.S. Symonds, Professor of Engineering at Brown University, 
voiced skepticism as to how one country could survive a major nuclear exchange “because 
a side that has surrendered a quarter of its population to effects of blast, heat, fire and 
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subsequent radiation sickness and general disease will have lost.”246 In his view it did not 
matter who managed to launch the first strike as “losing will be the case whether or not its 
opponents is even worse off, and regardless of how much war-fighting it still can do.”247 
Members of the scientific community viewed planning for nuclear war and the logic of 
Mutual Assured Destruction with incredulity.  
Conversely, an editorial in the Chicago Tribune speculated a worst-case scenario if 
the U.S. were to adopt restrictions in the number of nuclear arsenals at its disposal. “If 
disarmament becomes a one-way street,” wrote Carl Siegel, “we’ll soon find ourselves with 
a gun pointed at our heads and told to surrender or suffer the consequences of having 
nuclear bombs dropped on five or six of our major cities.”248 For the most part, a majority 
of Americans did not support nuclear proliferation but were concerned with deep cuts in 
the number of nuclear weaponry if the Soviet Union did not follow suit. A four day poll 
conducted by CBS news in May 1982 found that “most Americans support the concept of a 
freeze in Soviet and American nuclear arsenals, but they turn against the proposal if it 
means that the Soviet Union would gain a military advantage.”249 Out of 1,470 adults that 
were surveyed, “72% of those interviewed said that they favored putting a stop to the 
testing, production and installation of additional nuclear weapons by both sides, about half 
of them changed their minds and opposed a moratorium if it would give the Soviets a 
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nuclear edge over the U.S.”250 As the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II became a hot 
button topic, some Americans did not want to compromise strength for peace. 
 Medical professionals within the Physicians for Social Responsibility actively 
denounced crisis relocation planning as a possible defense against a nuclear attack. Its 
effectiveness was completely dependent upon two interrelated factors: the vast majority of 
American citizens had to be willing to temporarily relocate and capable of doing so.251 A 
Gallup poll conducted in May and June of 1982 surveyed a sample of 1, 000 adults to 
determine attitudes towards their state’s crisis relocation plans. Respondents were asked 
what they believed to be the “most important thing that the government should provide as 
part of the civil defense program.”252 Out of a possible six options, only 3% of the sample 
chose a relocation plan which was the lowest response for any of the options.253 Americans 
preferred the security of in place shelters and believed that was the most crucial piece of 
defense that the government could provide.254 Whether it was a lack of perceived feasibility 
or apathy towards planning for emergency mobilization procedures, American public 
opinion indicated that crisis relocation plans were viewed as the least attractive and 
effective option for surviving a nuclear war.  
 Out of the 400 designated high-risk areas, the Northeast corridor was cited 
repeatedly by civil defense detractors as being virtually impossible to evacuate. The sheer 
magnitude of people concentrated in a relatively small area caused civil defense planners 
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the most headaches out of any region across the country. Specifically with the case of New 
York, an estimated 43% of residents did not own an automobile in the early 1980s which 
meant that public transportation would play a role disproportionate to its infrastructure.255 
It was estimated that buses would have to operate for a minimum of fifteen hours per day 
over a three day period and “if only one round trip per day could be made by each bus, 
nearly 12, 000 bus vehicles would be required to evacuate New Yorkers.”256 The entire 
state of New York did not have the fleet of public transportation needed to move millions of 
inhabitants. Logistical issues compounded with realities and created a negative perception 
among members of the Physicians for Social Responsibility towards crisis relocation 
planning.  
 The New York City Council officially rejected emergency evacuation procedures in 
June 1982 by a vote of 35-5.257 There were too many skeptics that seriously doubted the 
feasibility of a massive operation involving thousands of fleeing New Yorkers to host 
counties, and a plethora of questions left unanswered by civil defense officials. Other states 
followed suit as details became ironed out by city council members concerned with the 
influx of people without an adequate infrastructure to accommodate them. James Moran, a 
City Councilman for Alexandria, Virginia, took his family on a 300-mile test run to the 
hamlet of Webster Springs, Virginia, before voting.258 Moran could not fathom how a tiny 
town with two grocery stores and forty motel rooms could have the capacity to deal with 
over 20, 000 fellow Virginians: “the trip took 7 ½ hours and called the evacuation plan 
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useless, asinine, bizarre to contemplate and right out of Alice in Wonderland.”259 Besides 
requiring more than the suggested single tank of gasoline to get to the destination, the 
suburban towns of Northern Virginia, D.C, and Montgomery and Prince George counties 
were also supposed to evacuate at the same time using gridlocked highways.260 Prior 
experiences with rush-hour traffic and emergency evacuation routes that were too lengthy 
contributed to a unanimous rejection in the Alexandria city hall crisis relocation planning 
vote.  
 Crisis relocation plans eventually were scrapped by FEMA as skepticism over the 
feasibility of mass migrations to host areas led to boycotts and rejection in states and cities 
throughout America. Russel Clanahan confirmed that by 1985 crisis relocation plans were 
dropped by 120 jurisdictions and said “evacuation remained an option in the crisis 
manager’s tool kit but was not the agency’s primary thrust.”261 Fiscal appropriations for 
civil defense also played a role in its demise with slashed budgets a common occurrence in 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency during the mid to late 1980s. By 1983 the 
Strategic Defense Initiative received the lion’s share of the defense budget and subsumed 
whatever funds that might have gone to FEMA. The Reagan Administration cut FEMA’s 
appropriations to a third of $181 million which “represented a major shift in national 
nuclear defense strategy.”262 With civil defense on the backburner, “protection of the 
population was relegated, whether consciously or not, to the highly controversial Strategic 
Defense Initiative program.”263 While receiving a significant shot in the arm once President 
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Reagan assumed office, other defense priorities became more important and left civil 
defense as an afterthought in popular culture and American memory. 
Chapter II - Conclusion 
The official concept promoted by civil defense officials throughout the 1970s and 
1980s was one of emergency evacuation. Crisis relocation plans had an incentive of a 
minimum requirement of energy and expenditures for the American populace. Pilot 
projects that targeted defense against man-made and natural disasters were introduced in 
the nation’s elementary school curriculum but were not well received among American 
educators. Children were taught the protocols of crisis relocation planning which departed 
from the advice of icons such as Bert the Turtle during the heyday of civil defense.  
A multitude of contingency plans were in place during the Reagan years that were 
designed to give the President survival options in the event of a Soviet pre-emptive strike 
as well as the tools to retaliate. These continuity of government plans were highly secretive 
to avoid an American war-ready image. Some private businesses took part in civil defense 
preparations but this was by no means a widespread practice. Businesses were explicitly 
created amid the heightened Cold War tensions, but often had a class dimension as the 
products and services offered were above the financial means of the middle-class American 
family. Public opinion polls in the early 1980s highlighted a sense of nuclear paranoia as 
respondents felt there was going to be a nuclear war in the near future. Scientists mirrored 
this sentiment as the “doomsday clock” moved to three minutes to midnight before 
Reagan’s second term.  
75 
 
Civil defense proponents treated planning for nuclear attacks and other disasters in 
the context of nuclear deterrence. Advocates likened the concept as an analogy comparable 
to a bulletproof vest or a seat belt in a car and argued that a civil defense program would 
reduce the consequences of a nuclear catastrophe by saving American lives as well as 
prevent a nuclear war from starting. While supporters viewed civil defense through the 
lens of humanitarian insurance, critics argued the opposite; to them, a strong civil defense 
program was dangerous as it would provoke the Soviet Union into confrontation.     
Civil defense officials reassured residents that ample warning time and everyday 
practice enabled emergency population mobilization. They maintained that a surprise 
nuclear attack was extremely unlikely and instead foresaw a period of rising international 
tensions that would give a minimum of three days of advanced warning time to evacuate 
American citizens. One member of Reagan’s cabinet went even further when he stated that 
all Americans would need to survive a nuclear holocaust was a shovel. Under the Carter 
and Reagan Administrations, the confidence exuded by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency never completely trickled down to the American people. For those 
concentrated in large, densely populated urban centers, the apparent infeasibility of 
emergency evacuation plans in the face of a nuclear attack created a sense of apathy.  
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Chapter III – The Privatization of Civil Defense and Cultural Reactions to Nuclear War 
 This next chapter will highlight certain aspects of nuclear culture that have not been 
part of the dominant discourse among American Cold War historians. Cultural reactions to 
nuclear weapons have taken a myriad of forms and historians Scott Zeman and Michael 
Amundson, in their book Atomic Culture: How We Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the 
Bomb, examined “cultural expressions and everything in between including Spiderman 
comic books, uranium board games, science fiction television shows and atomic-themed 
motion pictures.”264 The pre-existing literature is largely devoted to early Cold War popular 
culture; thus, closer attention to the late Cold War period is warranted. This will include an 
examination of privatized civil defense enthusiasts as well as assessing popular portrayals 
of nuclear war through the lens of film, fiction, children’s books and music. Reactions to the 
tension between the U.S. and Soviet Union came from non-government affiliated 
survivalists, directors, authors, and musicians, which is the focus of this chapter.  
 Advice manuals and newsletters published by private survivalists offered practical 
tips to safeguard interested Americans from a nuclear holocaust. Manuals laid out step by 
step instructions that included everything from expedient shelter construction complete 
with diagrams to defenses against biological and chemical weapon attacks. Survivalists 
generally expressed the conviction that proactive preparations were the keys to living 
through a Soviet first-strike. Claims of successes in situational field-tests were meant to 
show that any American could participate in survival preparations, but these tests were not 
verified by the scientific community. While the vast majority of non-government affiliated 
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civil defense proponents acted to prepare the public for doomsday out of genuine interest, 
there is no doubt that some chose to exploit public anxiety for the sake of profit. FEMA 
officials and privatized survivalists repeatedly assured Americans that there would be “life 
after doomsday” if they honed up on nuclear attack related survival skills. This contrasted 
with late Cold War popular culture which typically stressed the inhabitable conditions in a 
nuclear aftermath and depicted views of Armageddon.    
The Privatization of Civil Defense 
 Self-taught survivalists added another dynamic to the civil defense establishment; it 
became privatized. Besides being another channel of information for interested citizens; a 
plethora of advice columns, monthly newsletters, manuals and survivalist guides cropped 
up to reassure concerned Americans that emergency preparations would enable survival. 
Annual conferences were organized by the American Civil Defense Association but did not 
attract much public interest. For example, in 1981 only about 125 people attended the 
annual civil defense conference in California.265  One of the most vocal survivalists was 
Bruce Clayton, author of Life After Doomsday: A Survivalist Guide to Nuclear War and Other 
Major Disasters. Following the dual-use approach advocated by government officials, 
Clayton covered everything from tips on how to build different types of expedient shelters 
to planning for every kind of natural disasters. Similar to the overly optimistic assessments 
that came from FEMA and members of the Reagan Administration, non-government 
affiliated survivalists continued the trend of providing assurances that any American 
citizen could live through a nuclear holocaust if they took preventative measures.  
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 One of the expedient shelters mentioned in Clayton’s guide is the “Door-Over-
Trench Shelter”. He describes in considerable detail how to construct a trench “which is 
covered with door panels and then buried under three feet of mounded earth…with 
suitably constructed makeshift blast doors, it will resist blast pressures up to 15 pounds 
per square inch, the equivalent of a 300-400 mile per hour wind.”266 In the event of an 
impending attack, Americans were to quickly unscrew the hinges on their house doors and 
take refuge under the safety of the dirt and doors. According to Clayton the “Door-Over-
Trench” shelter was field-tested on several occasions to prove that any American family 
could accomplish the task. “In one instance”, wrote Clayton “a father who had never dug a 
trench before completed the shelter within 36 hours of receiving the instructions. His wife 
was an invalid and he was assisted by only one little girl.”267 Even a fatherless family 
demonstrated they could successfully build the “Door-Over-Trench” shelter in 34 hours.268 
Clayton exuded confidence that the task was not cumbersome and the tools needed to 
complete this type of expedient shelter could be found in any household. For those 
Americans who did not temporarily flee to host areas, a suitable blast-resistant structure 
could be finished before the three days of advance warning time so often cited by civil 
defense officials. 
 The “Car-Over-Trench” expedient shelter was also a survival measure advocated by 
privatized survivalists. Although this type was primarily for evacuees in designated high-
risk areas who fled to host counties, it could serve as a makeshift fallout shelter at home. 
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Privatized survivalists kept in tow with the main strategy of civil defense during the late 
Cold War period as the “Reagan plan advocated evacuation rather than the shelter building 
favoured in the 1960s.”269 Evacuees that took part in crisis relocation procedures would, in 
theory, temporary relocate to host communities and reside in homes, church basements, 
schools and businesses. If a community experienced a larger influx of people then they 
could accommodate, evacuees and town residents were to “work together to construct 
expedient shelters, digging trenches if other protection was unavailable.”270 Non-
government affiliated civil defense proponents maintained that if there was the will, there 
would be a way to survive. 
According to Clayton, the “car is driven over the trench to form a roof, after which 
the interior, the trunk and top of the hood are filled with dirt to provide overhead 
shielding.”271 The “Car-Over Trench” shelter required less than half the time it took to 
construct the “Door-Over-Trench” shelter, but Clayton conceded that these shelters were 
not blast resistant. In the winter of 1973 a couple with a small child field-tested this type of 
expedient shelter in Colorado.272 Once they received the full set of instructions the family 
“headed for the hills in their Ford Maverick…the father did all of the work and the shelter 
was completed in 14 ½ hours.”273 The inherent bonus of the expedient car shelter was the 
fact that the vast majority of evacuees were expected to relocate using their own private 
automobiles. Therefore the apparatus would already be at the host destination to provide 
protection. Privatized survivalists constantly repeated the mantra of being prepared for 
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survival after nuclear annihilation and backed up their claims with case studies of possible 
defensive measures. However, scientists or other experts in the field did not lend credence 
to these schemes.  
 The last chapter in Life After Doomsday deals with the implications of the post-attack 
aftermath and the possibility of having to fend off bands of hordes roving the country for 
supplies. Clayton conceded that the aspect of using force for survival “is a unique subject in 
a book of civil defense techniques simply because no government or humanitarian 
organization is capable of discussing it.”274 The “Gun Thy Neighbour” debate and 
subsequent backlash in the early 1960s caused many Americans to question the morality of 
civil defense enthusiasts and the appropriate methods one could take to survive. In the 
early 1980s a small fraction of privatized survivalists condoned the use of force to either 
obtain necessities or repel intruders.  
Barrett Tillman represented the moderate survivalist camp and was against having 
weapons. He preferred to “avoid confrontation, minimize exposure and attendant risk to 
the absolute minimum…good planning and rational preparation should make weapons use 
unnecessary.”275 Conversely, Clayton justified the use of force “if the supplies are your only 
hope of survival…anyone who attempts to steal or sabotage those supplies is attempting to 
murder you and your family.”276 He advocated that the best way to acquire basic 
necessities in the post-attack aftermath was to over-power the weak. Whether it was 
rhetoric from members of the Reagan Administration, officials at FEMA, or in this case, 
privatized civil defense survivalists, Americans became exposed to highly optimistic 
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assurances that drove home the point that “believe it or not, even a nuclear war is 
survivable.”277  
 Survival Tomorrow was an example of a privatized civil defense monthly newsletter 
that was established in 1977 under the previous title, Survive. When the founder, Mel 
Tappan, died his wife carried on his legacy and changed the name of the newsletter to 
Survival Tomorrow. Contributing authors wrote on a wide variety of survivalist topics that 
included crisis relocation and map reading, defense against biological and chemical 
warfare, protection from radiation, food storage and canning, home butchering and the use 
of weapons. While some articles expressed a pessimistic view on the prospect of surviving 
a nuclear war due to the individual stance of the author, the majority of the content in 
Survival Tomorrow repeated the mantra that emergency planning would allow those to 
survive in a post attack aftermath.  
 A three part series in 1986 highlighted the potential dangers if the U.S. were to fall 
victim to a Soviet biological or chemical weapon act (CBW). Freelance writer John Tillman 
warned readers that if they were “near a suitable target, you may want to factor the risk of 
chemical warfare into your survival planning calculations.”278 Tillman conceded that if 
Americans lived near “nuclear delivery means”279 a chemical attack would be the least of 
their concerns as Soviet nuclear warheads would likely be delivered there first. 
Nevertheless, he cautioned citizens on the dangers of biological and chemical agents as 
“aerially-dispersed pathogens could be released from bombers off the west coast of North 
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America or delivered in fairly ordinary shells, bombs, rockets and missiles.”280 A former 
East German spy for the United States informed Tillman of previous secret Soviet plans to 
attack the Ballistic Missile Early Warning stations with bacteriological and chemical 
weapons in a pre-emptive strike. He painted a frightening doomsday scenario in which the 
“advanced chemical would incapacitate the technicians at the bases for twelve hours, long 
enough for Soviet nuclear missiles to get through undetected.”281 With biological and 
chemical agents as another possible tool for the Soviet Union to invoke terror, privatized 
survivalists assured Americans that proper equipment and training would enable citizens 
to handle the crisis.    
 The most important protective measures for civilians were to have full body 
protection and gas masks layered with activated charcoal, the same type of material in 
cigarette filters.282 Tillman was confident that for those fleeing urban areas plagued with 
viral agents, “activated charcoal clothing should be adequate for civilians not required to do 
anything more strenuous than get out of a contaminated area.”283 For those that did not 
have access to sophisticated charcoal materials, the preparations to protect against a 
nuclear war or other major disaster would be beneficial towards a CBW attack. Privatized 
survivalists considered every aspect of civil defense planning as critical towards survival 
and incorporated unique scenarios in their prophecies no matter how remote the 
possibility.  
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 One contributing author suggested having strong outdoor survivor skills including 
experience in the bush as he imagined a “circumstance in which a few lucky survivors of a 
global disaster would be plunged back into a raw, natural existence.”284 Assuming that the 
world’s ecosystem remained intact, those who managed to survive a thermonuclear war 
would be forced to learn how to hunt for their own food and construct a make-shift 
homestead without the comfort of normal household amenities. The location of the 
epicenter in the blast was crucial to avoiding death, and Karl Hess believed if the “disaster 
struck far enough away to leave a fighting chance, wilderness survival knowledge certainly 
would be valuable.”285 A stockpile of canned foods would eventually run out so Hess 
emphasized that Americans needed to practice basic survival skills. 
 On the subject of defense against radioactive fallout, writer Saul Kent advised 
Americans to “make every effort to avoid massive exposure to radiation during 
wartime.”286 He claimed that if a nuclear bomb was dropped on U.S. cities the ultra-violet 
radiation emitted from the sun would substantially increase for months or years after and 
“could lead to serious eye and skin damages.”287 Kent recommended protecting eyes by 
“wearing UV sunglasses or by wearing glasses covered with opaque material, except for 
two horizontal slits 1/16th inch wide.”288 To avoid radiation exposure to the skin, citizens 
were to wear protective clothing and use “sunscreen lotions containing para-amino-
benzoic acid.”289 The best chance for survival was to be as far away from the detonation but 
if that was not possible, measures could be taken to minimize the risk of radiation 
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poisoning using the advice from Survival Tomorrow. Privatized survivalists capitalized on 
increased Cold War tensions and allowed for anxious Americans to brush up on civil 
defense skills, especially if there were no avenues available through local counties. Non-
government affiliated privatized survivalists offered their knowledge and expertise to 
paying Americans out of genuine concern, but a small fraction of entrepreneurs were 
motivated by sheer profit.  
 In comparison to the heyday of civil defense in the 1950s and 1960s, the activities of 
privatized survivalists in the 1970s and 1980s indicate a sense of continuity more than 
change. During the Berlin Crisis the private sector offered shelter building services and 
capitalized on public anxiety. The Acme Bomb and Fallout Shelters Co. located in Dallas, 
Texas “anticipated $100, 000 worth of orders in their first month of operation”290 and other 
private builders reported a surge in sales across the country. In the 1980s, New World 
Survival Co. and other private survivalists offered pre-fabricated shelters for anxious 
Americans who were willing to foot the bill. Such companies were a product of the times 
and were motivated by profits but some salesmen were genuinely sensitive to the 
conditions of the shelters. In the early 1960s the Lone Star Steel Co. shelter incorporated a 
“nicety to gladden the heart of any claustrophobe: a window painted on the wall showing 
an outdoor scene complete with a shade that can be pulled down at night.”291 A developer 
in Utah in the 1980s continued that trend and provided a tranquil atmosphere for anyone 
willing to live underground.   
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 Preparing for a nuclear war on a daily basis was a frightening aspect for Americans 
and to combat a lack of enthusiasm, Dean Ing, a privatized survivalist, suggested taking a 
“hobbyist’s approach…efforts can be so low-key that neighbours and even some family 
members are wholly unaware.”292 His logic behind taking a “hobby approach” was to avoid 
exhaustion in the long-term commitment to survival practices and so that “it doesn’t get us 
[survivalists] tagged as fruitcakes by folks who don’t understand.”293 Building up 
emergency preparedness knowledge required active participation by citizens in civil 
defense policies. People were expected to have maps with pre-planned evacuation routes, a 
list of possible family and friends in prospective host areas and a survival kit that included 
navigational aids and personal items. In the event of an emergency evacuation order the 
most detailed maps were crucial for developing alternative routes along major highways as 
well as “back roads in each area and all towns and villages along the way.”294 Having a 
back-up plan was essential to avoid potential bottlenecks along major arteries towards 
host communities. 
 For those that did not have loved ones or friends within a 250 mile radius, a friend 
of a friend could be an option even if they were relative strangers. To remedy that situation 
Americans could find “some other genuine reason for such a visit to their home”295 such as 
fishing or hiking, and if that were to work out the idea of bunking up during a time of crisis 
could be broached. Ulterior motives would not be discovered as easily this way and would 
increase the odds of survival for families who chose to temporary relocate. 
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 An issue of Survival Tomorrow in 1987 contained the actual emergency evacuation 
and safety notification postcards that the U.S. Postal service planned on issuing in the post-
attack aftermath of a nuclear war. The post office had sufficient quantities stockpiled in 
every locale for the estimated influx of visitors and the amount of residents.296 Once 
families had relocated, the safety notification and emergency evacuation cards could be 
mailed back, free of charge, to notify the government of the number of surviving family 
members so that mail could be forwarded to temporary addresses.297 Plans to create a 
national index for mail delivery were “further evidence that at least some people think a 
future war is survivable,”298 according to survivalist Carl Krupp. Negative attitudes 
regarding the feasibility of surviving a nuclear war were voiced by concerned citizens as 
well as a minority of privatized survivalists bent on changing the optimistic predictions 
from civil defense officials at FEMA. 
 Blast-resistant concrete bomb shelters and deep caves remained the only appealing 
retreats from a nuclear holocaust for Karl Hess, but he aptly noted that “they are miserable 
places to live…unless you are in one when a bomb goes off nearby, you might as well not 
have bothered locating or building the thing in the first place.”299 Hess was not convinced of 
the situation in which a period of rising international tensions would allow ample warning 
time for Americans to prepare, and cited natural disasters and Pearl Harbour as evidence of 
surprise events. In a thermonuclear war, “cars would simply be melted and not even the 
instruments of the millionaire’s stand-by jet would likely work when needed.”300 Such 
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discouraging assessments balanced out the idealistic scenarios that became mired in civil 
defense propaganda and expressed through private survivalist channels like Survival 
Tomorrow. 
 Two issues in the monthly newsletter in the mid-1980s highlight the dichotomy that 
existed between privatized survivalists in the quest to find a nuclear resistant Shangri-La. If 
a one megaton nuclear bomb was dropped somewhere in the U.S., Bruce Clayton posited 
that citizens “are much more likely to be a spectator than a victim at a range of twelve 
miles.”301 He believed that a thirty mile radius was more than adequate to survive a nuclear 
strike and felt that the anti-defense movement was responsible for stretching the truth 
about the ramifications of nuclear weapons.302 Clayton’s political views leaned towards the 
right end of the political spectrum which influenced his approach to privatized survival 
literature. He was against a nuclear weapon freeze and felt that America needed a 
strengthened civil defense program to survive a Soviet pre-emptive strike.  
 In sharp contrast to Clayton’s article, William Seavey pondered the agricultural 
problems associated with radioactive fallout and pointed to the issues of growing crops in 
frigid and deserted remote locations. Seavey concluded that “there are few precious towns 
or areas in the U.S. which could survive even a limited nuclear exchange.”303 The only states 
he recommended living in were Alaska, northern Nevada and southern Oregon due to their 
sparse, unpopulated expanses, but aside from that the best place to live was somewhere in 
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the Mexican or Canadian interior.304 While an example of a privatized survivalist that 
bucked the trend, the majority of non-government affiliated civil defense enthusiasts 
echoed the assurances from FEMA officials. Popular depictions of nuclear Armageddon and 
the possible defenses against it offered a different view.  
Nuclear War in Popular Culture 
How was civil defense and nuclear war portrayed in the 1980s in popular films, 
fiction, children’s books and music? American grass-root fears increased exponentially due 
to developments in popular culture of the era. Although atomic and nuclear war had 
received attention in films and popular fiction in the 1940s and 1950s, the theme reared 
again by the late Cold War period and entailed graphic depictions of a bleak post-attack 
aftermath in the U.S. Overall there is more continuity than change when it comes to 
comparing portrayals between early and late Cold War culture. For example, The Fate of the 
Earth and its “graphic description of what a nuclear attack would do to New York City 
would have been familiar to any reader of Life, Collier’s or Reader’s Digest in the late 
1940s.”305 A flurry of nuclear related fictional paperbacks and movies emerged in the late 
Cold War period as a multitude of authors, science fiction writers, directors and musicians 
were attracted to the power of the atom and capitalized on the boom in demand for nuclear 
themed entertainment. While some popular fiction forms were satirical and more garnered 
towards making a Hollywood box office success, others were anti-civil defense that 
advanced the notion that preparations for a nuclear catastrophe were utterly futile. 
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Late Cold War Films 
A Hollywood blockbuster starring Matthew Broderick entitled War Games was 
released in 1983 and as the acclaimed film critic Gene Siskel aptly noted, “the time is right 
in world history, with worldwide nuclear protests at a record level, for a thriller about a 
nuclear disaster.”306 David Lightman (Matthew Broderick) is a self-taught computer whiz 
kid living a typical teenage life in Seattle, WA. He uses his computer skills and hacks into 
the report card section at his Seattle high school to change his failing high school grades to 
avoid summer school.307 David breaks into the war-warning system at the North American 
Aerospace Command in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado and stumbles upon a computer 
game called “Global Thermonuclear War,” a simulation of nuclear exchanges between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, and he chooses to be on the Soviet side.308 According to 
one film reviewer, Jon Badham, director of War Games, “makes us believe in the idea of a 
vast, but easily penetrable computer world…his young protagonist gets into the Pentagon’s 
WOPR super computer and challenges it to a hot game of thermonuclear war.”309 Although 
merely a computer simulation, the issue is that the Pentagon interprets the situation as 
actually occurring and responds by moving its defense condition to the second highest 
level, DEFCON 4.  
The two writers of the film, Lawrence Lasker and Walter Parkes, visited NORAD 
prior to composing the script and became intrigued over the concept of computer 
controlled nuclear detonations. Just three weeks before their visit in June 1980, “a faulty 
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computer chip put the United States on a nuclear alert by mistake.”310 The thought of a 
computer that controlled the world’s nuclear arsenals was a stretch of the imagination, but 
a unique approach towards popular fiction films in the early 1980s. “There is growing 
pressure,” Lasker said “to take the responsibility for launching a nuclear attack away from 
humans and to give computers more power to make decisions.”311 The interesting thing 
about War Games is that you never actually see a nuclear strike or mushroom cloud so the 
death and destruction so common among nuclear war films is not present. However, the 
audience is made to believe that a pre-emptive strike could occur through a simple 
computer malfunction with no human oversight to override final decisions. The F.B.I. 
eventually pick up David at a 7/11 store to remedy the situation and bring a peaceful 
resolution. With nuclear disaster averted he is released to his parents with a stern warning 
from defense officials.  
How realistic was the film’s general thesis? Film critics questioned technology that  
“not only sorted out incoming data but also decided when and how to strike back and sends 
out executing orders…Air Force officers clarified that no such computer exists.”312 A 
spokesman at NORAD shed light on the logistics and protocols of launching a nuclear 
attack, whether it was pre-emptive or retaliatory, as he stated that “information from 
satellite and radar sensors goes through a computer and into displays and assessments 
only, with the President alone making the final decisions.”313 While War Games is 
completely unrealistic in terms of a saboteur situation, millions of Americans flocked to 
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theatres to see a comedic account of a seventeen year-old that almost annihilates millions 
of people in the Soviet Union and United States. Realistic possibilities were sacrificed 
purely for entertainment value and the director’s purpose was to fill investor’s coffers with 
box office ticket sales. As seen with Badham’s blockbuster hit, by the early 1980s popular 
fiction in the form of Hollywood movies had begun to cross the divide over stark, 
depressing tales of life in the post-attack aftermath and embraced nuclear weaponry as an 
important piece of the United States’ military-industrial complex. Other films suggested the 
futility of defenses in a thermonuclear war. 
The Day After was a made for television movie that the American Broadcasting 
Corporation (ABC) aired on 20 November 1983.314 For weeks before the broadcast 
newspaper articles warned of the graphic nature of the film and the “National Education 
Association sent out its first ever national alert and suggested that children under 12 not be 
allowed to view the movie.”315 The scheduled airing of the film coincided with American 
thanksgiving, a time when “tens of millions of people would be gathering around television 
sets in living rooms, not to enjoy a heartwarming holiday special, but to watch Kansas City 
get blown off the face of the earth.”316 An estimated 100 million people tuned into the film 
and “it was widely discussed across America for weeks afterward.”317 The film graphically 
depicts the effects of a nuclear strike on the residents of Lawrence, Kansas, and Kansas City, 
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Missouri and its surrounding communities.318 The movie largely centers around four 
American families; one family lives extremely close to a missile silo.319  
Jim Dahlberg is seen in the film informing his daughter that there is not enough food 
for the family, so Rusty, the family dog, has been left outside to die.320 The only people to 
survive until the end of the film is the Dahlberg farm family who, in the view of one film 
critic, “are at least shown to have taken shelter in their basement…their continued good 
health ascribed more protection than an ordinary basement would actually afford.”321 At 
the end of The Day After, Jim Dahlberg is shot by a refugee and as journalist Edward 
Zuckerman writes: “here the film is very convincing. The picture it paints of post-attack 
social disintegration-food riots, looters, firing squads- seems an inevitable consequence of 
massive nuclear war. FEMA’s rosier version of the post-attack U.S…is shattered by The Day 
After.”322 Upon completion of the movie, ABC inserted a disclaimer that was meant to calm 
fears expected to have increased exponentially with viewing the film. The disclaimer stated 
that the “catastrophic events you have just witnessed are, in all likelihood, less severe than 
the destruction that would actually occur in the event of a full nuclear strike against the 
United States.”323 Thus through the prism of popular media, depictions of nuclear war and 
civil defense on the big screen painted a bleak picture of the post-attack aftermath on 
American soil. A dichotomy existed in which defense against nuclear war was portrayed as 
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utterly futile which contrasted with the overly optimistic reassurances that emanated from 
officials within the civil defense agency.  
As historian Beth Fischer has written, the topic of nuclear war had been dealt with 
before in movies, “usually through documentary format, but never in such a graphic and 
hard-hitting manner…it was anecdotal, focusing on the daily lives of people in Lawrence, 
Kansas…this sense of familiarity made the subsequent events all the more horrific.”324 The 
audience had time to establish a connection with the families on the big screen as the 
nuclear attack does not occur until the half-way point in the two hour viewing. Therefore 
the ability to identify with individuals such as the Dahlbergs was strong and led many 
Americans to jump to the conclusion and see themselves in a similar situation.  
The Day After primed over half of the U.S. adult population on the horrendous 
consequences of thermonuclear war and “in countless planned and unplanned discussions 
that followed”, reported Roger Shinn, “it aroused a public consciousness of vast 
proportions.”325 In one night, in less than 120 minutes, the futility of civil defense was 
showcased on prime time television and the vast majority of American adults tuned in. 
Over one hundred million viewers were exposed to a film that was at cross-purposes with 
the civil defense establishment. Public apathy was a re-occurring obstacle to overcome for 
civil defense planners and the made for television drama succeeded in piquing Americans’ 
interests towards the perils of the arms race, which was something FEMA officials were 
unable to achieve. 
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Reagan viewed an advance private screening of The Day After on 10 October 1983 
and claimed “it is powerfully done, all $7 million worth. It is very effective and left me 
greatly depressed. So far they haven’t sold any of the 25 ads scheduled and I can see 
why.”326 According to one of Reagan’s biographers, Edmund Morris, Reagan’s diary entry 
regarding the film was the first and only time that he had indicated he had felt 
depressed.327 The private screening certainly was an anxious experience for the President 
and this changed his views on the subject of nuclear war. Comments from the press spoke 
to the realistic elements of the production that fostered national awareness of the dangers 
of nuclear war. “It could help jolt the U.S. out of its bemused drift towards disaster” wrote 
Roger Shinn, “or it could intensify anxiety into paralysis.”328 In their view, the hazards of 
nuclear war had finally been realistically portrayed on the silver screen but the jury was 
out on whether that would propel American citizens into action or scare them into 
submission.  
Much like The Day After, Testament was also a made for television movie that aired 
on the Public Broadcasting Station in December 1983, and was picked up by Paramount 
Pictures and turned into a silver screen success. The tone of the movie is anti-civil defense 
and cast doubts over survival predictions of life in America after a nuclear bomb explodes. 
Set in San Francisco, California, the Wetherly family and the rest of the states’ residents 
receive an alert during a television program from the White House of an imminent Soviet 
attack on the west coast.329 At the town hall meeting that day in the church one concerned 
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man expresses disbelief over emergency evacuation procedures as he lamented: “what civil 
defense, are you people crazy? You people are talking like it is a hurricane or 
earthquake!”330 Angry line-ups at the local gas stations became commonplace as residents 
were in a hurry to flee the city. The Wetherlys decided to take refuge in the basement and 
stuck together as a family unit. 
Once the husband, Tom, becomes one of the first victims to die from radiation 
poisoning it was up to Carol to keep the family together.331 Lynne Littman, the director, 
strove to emotionally attach the audience to the characters on the screen by showcasing 
the drama of a single family coping with the aftermath of chaos, death and radiation. At a 
pre-screening, “audience members rushed to the phone booth to call their loved ones…the 
movie made them just want to check if everyone was OK.”332 Within a few months the 
movie “appeared among the highest grossing films tabulated each week by Variety, the 
show-business newspaper.”333 The film was part of the boom in nuclear related 
entertainment in the early 1980s. 
The airing of Testament was met with mixed reviews among film critics. Some felt 
that it did a more effective job than The Day After portraying optimism in the face of 
Armageddon, and the unbreakable bonds of family. One reporter claimed that it was “more 
intimate, more sustained in its confrontation of the individual human dimension of 
holocaust, more indelibly affecting than The Day After.”334 Conversely, a reporter with the 
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Christian Science Monitor blasted the film for “dodging too many issues by focusing on a 
town untouched by immediate destruction…the film errs by treating physical 
considerations almost entirely in emotional terms and concentrating all its energy on 
domestic melodrama.”335 Both movies depict the moral bankruptcy of humanity as society 
breaks down in the nuclear aftermath. Chaotic traffic jams, angry line-ups at gas stations 
and bandits stealing supplies from defenseless families were the result. The difference is 
that The Day After entails graphic depictions of people vaporized by a massive mushroom 
cloud from a nuclear bomb. One common theme between the two made for television 
movies was their messages of despair and the futility of civil defense preparations in the 
face of nuclear annihilation. 
Through the lens of the silver screen, popular culture adopted a more sinister tone, 
with some exceptions, when dealing with nuclear issues. Testament continued that trend 
and “depicted the after-effects of a nuclear disaster by carving a bleak reality into everyday 
life.”336 Societal anxieties were stoked by popular accounts of nuclear war which created a 
sense of apathy towards the civil defense establishment. While American citizens 
continued to be reassured by FEMA officials’ overly optimistic assessments and an eighty 
percent survival prediction, the realm of popular culture offered a completely different 
view that usually painted scenes of utter chaos, annihilation and contamination.  
Late Cold War Fiction 
Societal fears at the grass-roots level were further stoked by popular fiction in the 
late Cold War period. Jonathan Schell wrote The Fate of the Earth on the impact of nuclear 
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war in 1982 and it originally ran as a series in The New Yorker.337 Millions of readers who 
had not yet read the monograph were exposed to Schell’s grim outlook on the planet and 
human nature if a nuclear war occurred. The book is divided into three chapters which 
reflect his pessimistic assessment of the post-attack aftermath: a republic of insects and 
grass, the second death and the choice.338 Schell constantly stressed the theme of total 
annihilation and “dramatically described the direct and indirect effects of nuclear war: 
immediate blast, thermal and radiation effects, extreme weather changes, famine and 
plague.”339 In his view, civil defense preparations were completely useless as “evacuation 
before an attack would be an exercise in transporting people from one death to another.”340 
There were no adequate safeguards to protect the population if the Soviet Union decided to 
launch a pre-emptive strike.  
With regards to FEMA’s crisis relocation plans and shelters, Schell maintained that 
they offered nothing more than false assurances to the American people. He was convinced 
if an enemy was determined to launch an attack they would “simply retarget its missiles 
against people in places to which they had fled.”341 Another disadvantage to emergency 
evacuation plans were the inherent possibilities of false alarms. Crisis relocation policies 
offered the Soviets a “means of utterly disrupting the society by threats alone, since an 
evacuated society would be one that stopped functioning.”342 The ability to handcuff the 
American economy merely with threats was a scenario that was envisioned.  
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In terms of sheltering the population, Schell perceived the sophisticated technology 
of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles as being too quick to contend with. Dismissing the 
widely held belief of three days of advanced warning time prepare, The Fate of the Earth 
posits that “economically feasible shelters cannot provide protection against the blast, heat, 
intense radiation and mass fires that would probably occur in densely populated regions of 
the country.”343 Although he did not distinguish between the more exorbitant blast shelters 
or less costly expedient shelters the assessment was straight forward: there would be no 
winners in a thermonuclear war. 
Schell expressed concern over the environment’s ability to withstand and rebound 
from nuclear annihilation. Put bluntly, the “vulnerability of the environment is the last 
word in the argument against the usefulness of shelters: there is no hole big enough to hide 
all of nature in.”344 Historian Thomas Kerr stated that Schell’s main conclusion is “simply 
that nuclear war would be so horrible that it is senseless to think of trying to cope with it at 
all.”345 Taken together with popular depictions in films like The Day After and Testament, 
there was a sense of realism that did not exist within FEMA. While civil defense proponents 
espoused reassurances to Americans that preparation could enable survival, popular 
accounts of the time period contradicted this philosophy and continued to drive home a 
bleak picture of a post-attack aftermath. 
Another novel to tackle the complexities of a post-attack America was published in 
1975 by Robert O’Brien. Z for Zachariah is a fictional, autobiographical story of a fifteen 
year-old girl named Ann Burden who struggles to deal with the loss of her parents after a 
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thermonuclear weapon destroys the United States. The only other person to survive the 
blast is John R. Loomis, a chemist at Cornell University. Loomis makes the journey from 
Ithaca to Claypole Ridge and encounters the only other survivor, Ann. However, it is not 
promising as it takes him ten weeks and “all that time, he had seen no living thing- no 
people, no animals, no birds, no trees, not even insects- only gray wasteland, empty 
highways and dead cities and towns.”346 While Ann survives in an underground shelter, 
John was spared due to his highly important work in developing a magnetized plastic 
radiation proof suit for the army “so that troops could live and fight on in places that had 
been atom-bombed.”347 He manages to finish the suit before the war breaks out.  
Loomis eventually gets very ill from radiation poisoning and is plagued by intense 
episodes of delirium and a fever that reaches 106 degrees. The story ends with John’s re-
telling of a vivid dream of seeing birds to the west and views it as a positive sign of good 
things to come; “While I was sleeping the dream came, and in the dream I walked until I 
found the classroom and the children…the dream was gone, yet I knew which way to go. I 
am hopeful.”348 Z for Zachariah does contain a fairly optimistic ending that leaves the 
overall assessment up to the reader’s interpretation. However, the fictional novel clearly 
presents a sombre story of complete death and destruction. Technological advancements in 
the form of plastic radiation proof suits were still no match for the annihilation of 
thermonuclear warfare. In O’Brien’s view human ingenuity did not have the power to 
trump the atom.  
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Unlike The Fate of the Earth and Z for Zachariah which explore the perils of nuclear 
war and the uninhabitable conditions of life in a post-attack America, I, Martha Adams 
strays from traditional novels in the sense that the U.S. eventually triumphs over the 
Soviets and there are minimal losses of American lives. Published in 1984 by Pauline Glen 
Winslow, it is a fictional account of a family trying to get to a secret missile silo after a 
Soviet pre-emptive strike and subsequent unconditional American surrender.  
Martha Adams works for the United Nations at the World Health Organization and 
her husband Josh is an engineer who maintains and repairs the ICBM silos in Grand Forks, 
North Dakota. Together they have a son, Buzz, about to start his freshman year at Yale until 
the radio announces one morning that “at 5am EST Soviet missiles launched from Panama 
and Cuba by-passed our Early Warning System and struck our major missile sites in the 
west. A second simultaneous strike was launched against our bomber fleets and 
submarines.”349 President Carmody signs the Instrument of Surrender at the White House 
by 7am to avoid a third strike on major population centers.350 Initial assessments by the 
Environmental Protection Agency were opportunistic as the television news anchor 
informs viewers that “there should be comparatively little loss of life due to radiation. Our 
large population centres have been spared.”351 Life for those who survive quickly changes 
as America gradually shifts towards a police state with limited free speech: The New York 
Times is taken over by the Morning Star and the White House changes to the People’s 
House. 
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Martha suspects that Josh likely died in the nuclear attack but holds out hope until it 
is confirmed that Grand Forks is blown off the map. She grows more concerned as the days 
pass about her fellow countrymen and their defeatist attitudes. Her son, Buzz, spoke of 
getting an organized group together to overthrow the Soviets but “there was still nothing to 
rally around, no weapon with which to threaten the conqueror who had won by 
engendering the ultimate fear.”352 In a moment of clarity Martha remembers a certain note 
that was sent by her husband that contains drawings of missile shelters.  
One peculiar missile had a different reference number, code named MAGNANIMITY, 
that had a completion date of 18 December 1982; Martha knew that “this was a calling from 
beyond the grave but this was no voice of comfort: it was a call to arms.”353 Aside from a 
few other high-ranking U.S. government officials, “the only knowledge of the whereabouts 
of the Doomsday weapon was in the 5 feet 6 inches of this slender, good-looking American 
woman.”354 Martha, through Josh’s contacts, arranges a rendezvous with Cl. Fairfield and an 
Israeli intelligence agent and covertly travels to Moab, Utah which is the location of the 
MAGNANIMITY site. On 26 October as the anniversary parade is occurring in Moscow, 
Martha delivers a message to the United Nations general meeting and demands the 
immediate evacuation of all Soviet troops. Having the Doomsday weapon up her sleeve she 
sternly warns that “any delay or failure to expedite and complete the said evacuation will 
result in the annihilation of the U.S.S.R. from Smolensk to the Kolyma range.”355  
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I, Martha Adams is a unique, fictional tale that departs from the typical doom and 
gloom nuclear themed literature of the late Cold War period. Although the President 
submits to Soviet demands it ends up saving countless numbers of lives. Radiation is 
contained to the west coast and it is largely the military installations that end up being 
targeted. The tone of the novel is triumphant; even though the U.S.’ capacity to retaliate is 
effectively rendered obsolete there ended up being a secret weapon. Perhaps the message 
of the story was to reassure Americans that the government would always be able to find a 
way to respond with similar measures. Far from being anti-nuclear, Winslow seems to 
embrace thermonuclear weapons as a saving grace. In the late Cold War period the boom in 
nuclear war popular fiction took a different form when presented to a younger target 
audience.   
Late Cold War Children’s Books 
How were children presented with the frightening material of nuclear war through 
the prism of popular culture in the 1980s? The medium of animation was often the 
preferred method as it enabled children’s authors to tone down a serious subject matter 
with satirical and comedic observations. Two of the best well-known examples that were 
published in the early to mid-1980s were The Butter Battle Book by Dr. Seuss and Raymond 
Briggs’ When the Wind Blows. The Butter Battle Book, published in 1984, is about the Yooks 
and Zooks which are two fundamentally different fictional species separated by a wall. The 
main difference is that “in every Zook house and in every Zook town, every Zook eats his 
bread with the butter side down!”356 Conversely, Yooks “as you know, when we breakfast 
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or sup, spread our bread with the butter side up.”357 Presented from the Yook side, the 
main protagonists are a grandpa and his grandson; the grandpa recounts the escalating 
arms race between the Yooks and Zooks and the desire to build powerful super weapons.  
The Yooks and Zooks try to out-do one another by inventing ever more 
sophisticated weaponry such as the Triple-Sling Jigger, the Jigger-Rock Snatchem and the 
Eight-Nozzled, Elephant-Toted Boom-Blitz.358 Eventually the Yooks acquire a “gadget that’s 
newer than new…filled with mysterious Moo-Lacka-Moo, and can blow all those Zooks 
clear to Sala-ma-goo. They’ve invented the Bitsy Big-Boy Boomeroo!”359 The Yooks were 
ordered to stay underground by the Chief Yookeroo as they discovered that the Zooks had a 
Bitsy Big-Boy Boomeroo of their own. The story ends with the grandson asking the 
question “who’s going to drop it? Will you…? Or will he…? Be patient, said Grandpa. We’ll 
see.”360 The implicit lesson taught to a younger generation in The Butter Battle Book is that 
in a nuclear war neither side has the upper-hand. Furthermore, Dr. Seuss demonstrated 
that the ideological differences, manifested through a preference for how to eat bread with 
butter, were trifling.   
The Yooks and Zooks’ escalating arms race is a great analogy that reflected the 
international situation between the two superpowers by the early 1980s. Reagan’s desire 
to negotiate from a “position of strength” ultimately led to the deployment of American 
Pershing II missiles in Europe in 1983361 and the development of the highly controversial 
SDI program, which symbolized that the arms race would not exclude outer space. In that 
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context, children’s authors used the fictional accounts of cartoons and combined them with 
the realities of the Cold War to teach children the futility of nuclear weaponry. In doing so, 
literature icons such as Dr. Seuss were able to take a terrifying subject and turn it into a 
light-hearted, comedic form of entertainment suitable for children. The purpose was not 
just entertainment but to foster awareness to the realities of the international scene as well 
as educate the masses on the perils of nuclear weaponry.  
Raymond Briggs released a children’s comic in 1982 in the United Kingdom and it 
was published a few years later in the United States. When the Wind Blows provides a 
tongue-in-cheek analysis of civil defense, the concept of MAD and the rising international 
Cold War tensions. A retired couple named James and Hilda experience the trials and 
tribulations of preparing for a nuclear strike. James is much more proactive in the realm of 
civil defense planning by reading up on pamphlets and executing the instructions, but Hilda 
is portrayed as being more concerned with maintaining the aesthetics of their home. The 
Householder’s Guide to Survival recommends taking refuge under doors, cushions and 
books and Hilda asks if they have to dig a hole like the Andersons did in WWII.362  James 
wryly replies, “Oh no, dear. That’s all old-fashioned. With modern scientific methods, you 
just use doors with cushions and books on top.”363 Alluding to the inexpensive expedient 
shelters, Hilda is informed that the doors will be unscrewed from their home and was 
appalled; “You are not going to ruin the paintwork, James!”364 Balancing the theme of 
nuclear war with scenes of a stereotypical over-bearing wife allowed Briggs to inject 
satirical humour into a dark subject.   
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After being alerted of incoming Soviet bombers via a radio address from the Prime 
Minister, Hilda and James get into their paper potato bags and prepare for the inevitable. As 
they lay waiting Hilda is enlightened on the prospect of MAD and comments that she 
thought her “old Dad was in the Mutual Assured Insurance…penny a week it was in those 
days.”365 With children not likely to understand or be aware of the concept of MAD, When 
the Wind Blows pokes fun at the naivety of the retired wife and the confusion she has with 
an insurance policy. The couple eventually endures extreme bouts of radiation poisoning 
and decide to wait for emergency personnel to arrive even though there had been no signs 
of other human life in the previous week. Popular culture depictions of nuclear annihilation 
took a myriad of forms as it was manifested through made for television dramas, 
Hollywood films, literature and even children’s comics. Children’s authors often chose the 
medium of animation to present a satirical and light-hearted story that had relevance to the 
international situation. Dr. Seuss and Raymond Briggs capitalized on the anxieties of an 
international confrontation during the early 1980s and added to the boom of nuclear 
themed forms of entertainment suitable for elementary aged children.  
Late Cold War Music 
Musicians, most often Rock-n-Roll bands, also weighed in on the phenomenon of 
nuclear Armageddon and were able to reach a larger segment of the population. Late Cold 
War music took aim at issues of nuclear weaponry and civil defense as recording artists 
voiced their opinions on the international arms race. Although musicians in the 1950s 
incorporated atomic themes in various genres, authors and recording artists had a 
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“resurgence of concern”366 in the early 1980s and brought rising international tensions and 
civil defense into the mainstream of American popular culture. While some artists treated 
the subject as a serious threat to human civilization, other singers chose to poke fun at 
world leaders and the overly optimistic assessments of survival cited by government 
officials. 
 Paul Boyer posits that the American public “typically encounter the nuclear reality 
in indirect ways, often through mass-culture channels.”367 While primarily targeted 
towards a younger generation, rock-n-roll songs produced in the late Cold War period 
influenced a vast audience as forms of education and entertainment. In the song “2 Suns in 
the Sunset”, Pink Floyd recalled witnessing a sunset in a rear view mirror and experiencing 
“premonitions/confirm suspicions/of the holocaust to come.”368 Similar cautionary 
sentiments were expressed by the band Midnight Oil in the song “Put Down that Weapon”: 
“put down that weapon or we’ll all be gone/ you can’t hide nowhere with the torchlight 
on.”369 Rock musicians reacted to growing international tensions and the aggressive 
rhetoric employed by world leaders as they pleaded for peace and an end to stockpiling 
nuclear arsenals. Like children’s books, the purpose was not just entertainment but to 
educate and raise awareness to the consequences of the atom.  
 U2 released a single in 1987 entitled “Bullet in the Sky” and they sang about a 
hypothetical nuclear attack in which they could “see the face of fear/running scared in the 
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valley below.”370 The tone of the track was dark as “droning guitars frighteningly simulated 
the sound of incoming missiles.”371 The output of nuclear themed music in the late Cold 
War period was an international phenomenon. In the U.S., immensely popular rock-n-roll 
icon Sting wrote a track called “Russians” that was a hit among the 1985 billboard charts. 
Sting urged listeners to see the commonalities between people of different nations and 
sang: “there’s no such thing as a winnable war/ it’s a lie we don’t believe anymore.”372 
Recording artists generally viewed the world’s nuclear arsenals as posing a serious danger 
to human civilization. Musicians such as Pink Floyd, U2, Midnight Oil and Sting responded 
to late Cold War tensions between the Soviets and Americans which “reflected the depth of 
public concern” and “created widespread sentiment for doing something about the nuclear 
threat.”373  
 Some artists specifically criticized the Reagan Administration’s defense priorities 
and characterized the President as a brainless puppet. “Land of Confusion” by Genesis is a 
satirical, anti-nuclear song about the uncertainty of the times. The music video portrays a 
senile Reagan having a nightmare and when he wakes up to buzz the nurse, he accidentally 
hits the nuke button instead.374 Other members of the Reagan camp were also subject to 
derision on the pop charts.  
T.K. Jones, an official with the Reagan Administration who advised Americans that 
all they needed to survive a nuclear Armageddon was a shovel, provided fodder for 
folksinger Fred Small with the song “Dig a Hole in the Ground.” Small instructed the 
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American people to “just dig a hole in the ground/ climb right on down/ lay some boards 
on top of you/ and sprinkle dirt around/ you won’t have to be dead/ if you only plan 
ahead/ you’ll be glad you kept a shovel on hand.”375 In direct response to Jones’ interview 
with reporter Robert Scheer, Small sarcastically exposed the overly optimistic assessment 
of one Republican politician. Crisis relocation procedures were also targeted in his music: 
“if your plates are odd-numbered please don’t panic, you’ll be fine/ just politely let those 
even-numbered cars go first in line.”376 The nuclear threat was serious enough to warrant 
the attention of some of the biggest recording artists in the 1980s. While some musicians 
used their influence to sway public opinion towards pushing for the end to nuclear 
weapons, others took aim at the Reagan Administration’s assurances of survival and left an 
important mark on American popular culture in the late Cold War period. 
Chapter III - Conclusion  
Tensions between the U.S. and Soviet Union in the late Cold War years were 
manifested through the phenomenon of privatized civil defense and were reflected in 
various aspects of popular culture. Non-government affiliated survivalists followed the 
dual-use approach advocated by FEMA, which included planning for natural and man-made 
disasters and, with some exceptions, provided an optimistic reassurance that a nuclear war 
was survivable.  
A host of advice columns, manuals and monthly newsletters such as Survival 
Tomorrow emerged as the era of détente unravelled and offered a forum for privatized civil 
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defense tips. Due to it being outside the arm of government, survivalists were able to 
broach sensitive subjects such as the use of force in a post-attack aftermath, something 
FEMA was unable to weigh in due to moral and ethical concerns. All possible defense 
aspects were covered, even against biological and chemical weapon attacks no matter how 
remote the possibility. Claims of successful field-tests by survivalists were meant to show 
the ease of planning and execution that could be done by any American family but tests 
were without scientific backing. Non-government affiliated privatized survivalists provided 
practical tips out of genuine interest and concern and can be characterized as eager do-
gooders, however, increased public anxiety over the possibility of a nuclear attack created a 
convenient opportunity for profit seeking entrepreneurs.  
The realm of popular culture stoked nuclear fears as depictions of civil defense and 
the post-attack America were treated with grim despair. Directors, authors, literary icons 
and musicians capitalized on the boom in nuclear themed entertainment in the late Cold 
War period and offered a more realistic view of life after nuclear Armageddon than the rosy 
outlook of FEMA officials. War Games and I, Martha Adams bucked the trend of doom and 
gloom so common among popular culture in the 1980s, but were exceptions as most forms 
were at odds with the civil defense establishment. Nuclear related movies and fictional 
works influenced the masses to reject the philosophy of civil defense proponents as they 
drove home the message that any defense against a nuclear strike was futile. The scenes 
painted by writers and producers were of utter chaos and extinction.  
Children’s authors touched on the perils of the nuclear arms race and chose the 
medium of animation to tone down a subject not suitable for kids. Nuclear war was treated 
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in a comedic, light-hearted manner and taught the implicit lesson that there was no such 
thing as a winner in thermonuclear war. Rock musicians helped to bring civil defense and 
nuclear issues into the mainstream of American popular culture. While some chose to use 
the stage to poke fun at world leaders and FEMA predictions, most treated nuclear weapon 
stockpiles as a serious threat to humanity. Entertainment and education were blended to 
foster awareness to the dire consequences of a mushroom cloud. Americans were exposed 
to rosy reassurances by both non-government affiliated survivalists and FEMA officials that 
planning and preparations would lead to survival in the event of a Soviet pre-emptive 
strike. The realm of popular culture imbued a completely different philosophy and taught 
people the perils and consequences of nuclear weapons as well as the futility of civil 
defense.  
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Conclusion 
During the Nixon, Carter and Reagan administrations, civil defense director’s 
employed a philosophy of dual-use and instructed citizens to be in a constant state of 
preparedness for both natural and man-made disasters. Officials emphasized the 
similarities between planning for a nuclear attack and a hurricane, for example, but this 
was met with derision from critics who believed that such disasters could not be lumped 
into a single category. Proponents, whether privatized or government affiliated, firmly 
believed in the efficacy of these programs but there is no doubt some chose to capitalize on 
public hysteria. Civil defense advocates framed the notion of civil defense as providing a 
credible posture of deterrence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union while detractors, mostly in the 
medical and scientific communities, argued that having a civil defense program promoted a 
false sense of security.  
There were aspects of continuity with regards to popular depictions of nuclear war 
in the early to late Cold War period, as well as the privatization of civil defense. In the 
1980s non-government affiliated survivalists continued the trend of providing overly 
optimistic assurances that honing up on survival skills would get anyone through a nuclear 
Armageddon. Developers and contractors in the early and late Cold War years offered 
services such as bomb shelter building during heightened period of international tensions 
and reported a surge in sales. Popular depictions of nuclear war and the possible defenses 
against it was a theme that was apparent in the 1950s and 1960s and reared again in the 
1970s and 1980s. Portrayals in popular culture reflected more continuity than change as 
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late Cold War depictions contained graphic depictions of a post attack United States; much 
like it did in the early Cold War period. 
Nuclear war and civil defense in the late Cold War period was portrayed through a 
myriad of popular culture channels including films, fiction, children’s books and music. 
Rock musicians and science fiction writers brought awareness to the nuclear threat which 
suggests a pervasiveness of nuclear issues in popular culture. Whether it was films, fiction, 
children’s books or music, late Cold War culture was at complete odds with policy. The rosy 
reassurances provided by government civil defense planners and privatized survivalists 
contrasted with cultural depictions of nuclear war and the futility of civil defense. In the 
realm of popular culture there was a stark contradiction between a political movement 
pushing for civil defense and a cultural movement resisting it.   
Right wing American politicians, through lobbying organizations like the Committee 
on the Present Danger, pushed for an increased defense budget in the late 1970s as they 
firmly believed they had fallen behind the Soviet Union and a ‘civil defense gap’ existed. The 
national debate over a survivability gap brought greater national awareness to the urgency 
of civil defense on American soil. Supporters likened civilian defense to familiar analogies 
that stressed preventative measures and the ability to save American lives, but opponents 
argued the opposite; a strong civil defense program would only serve to provoke the 
Soviets and therefore increase the likelihood of a nuclear catastrophe. Throughout the 
1970s and 1980s the confidence exuded by the various civil defense agencies never 
completely trickled down to the American people. For those concentrated in large, densely 
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populated urban centers, the apparent infeasibility of crisis relocation plans in the face of a 
nuclear attack created a sense of apathy. 
Increased tensions between the United States and Soviet Union led members of the 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists to move the “doomsday clock” to three minutes to midnight 
by the early 1980s. The only time it was placed closer to midnight was thirty years earlier 
with the advent of the hydrogen bomb. The “doomsday clock” gauged the American public’s 
fear and anxiety and took into account factors such as the international arms race as well as 
relations between the two superpowers. Gallup Polls conducted during the early 1980s 
mirrored the concerns expressed by scientists as a majority of American citizens believed a 
nuclear war would occur before the decade was over.  
The election of Ronald Reagan and the national debate over an alleged ‘civil defense 
gap’ added new energy and financial resources to the civil defense establishment. The 
President personally believed in having a strong civil defense program and was convinced 
of a survivability gap that existed between the Soviet Union. Reagan was elected with the 
mantra to promote public cynicism towards government and created a contradiction; how 
could you encourage skepticism towards government and expect public receptivity with 
government initiated civil defense planning? By the mid-1980s crisis relocation plan 
detractors outnumbered the cities with plans in place and the high profile Strategic Defense 
Initiative garnered the lion’s share of the American defense budget. Fiscal appropriations 
returned to the meagre levels that plagued the agency during the Johnson and Nixon years. 
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